CS285: Multi-Agent Systems
Instructor:
David Parkes
last-name - at - eecs.harvard.edu
Teaching Fellow:
Dimitrios Antos
last-name - at - fas.harvard.edu
Meeting time: Tuesdays & Thursdays 11:30-1:00 PM ( first class February 3 )
Location: Maxwell Dworkin 223, 33 Oxford Street
Office Hours: David: Maxwell Dworkin 229, 1-2 PM Tuesday
Dimitrios: Maxwell Dworkin 217, 2-4 PM on Mondays
Announcements
Tue 2/3: First-class handout is here.
Sat 2/7: Comments should be now submitted to this page.
Tue 2/10: This was a slide from the 1st class: 1552_001.pdf.
Wed 2/18: Please give us feedback here.
Tue 2/24: The first homework is out: download it.
Sat 2/28: Check the schedule page for additional readings for last week's material.
Sat 2/28: Deadline for the first homework extended to March 10.
Tue 3/31: The second homework is out: download it.
Tue 3/31: Q&A for the second homework can be found here.
Wed 4/1: Sections are every Wednesday at 5 PM in Maxwell-Dworkin G135.
Tue 4/21: Q&A for the third homeowkr can be found here.
Tue 4/21: The third homework is out: download it.
Thu 4/30: Final report due Monday, May 11, 5 PM. No extension will be given. Bring a hard copy to David or Dimitrios or Ann Marie King (MD 133), and e-mail us a soft copy as well.
General Information
Algorithmic, game-theoretic and logical foundations of multi-agent systems, including distributed optimization and problem solving, non-cooperative game theory, learning and teaching, communication, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, negotiation, coalitional game theory, logics of knowledge and belief, collaborative plans and social systems.
Course Goals
A multi-agent system is composed of multiple autonomous entities, with distributed information, computational ability, and possibly divergent interests. Multi-agent systems may be cooperative, as in those of sensor networks and mobile robots in a warehouse, or competitive, as in those of electronic commerce, or for resource or task allocation to competing firms. The agents in a multi-agent system may be both artificial and human (and often humans are present at least on the "edges" to provide preference information.)
The goal of this class is to provide a broad and rigorous introduction to
the theory, methods and algorithms of multi-agent systems.
The material spans disciplines as diverse as computer science
(including artificial intelligence, theory and distributed systems),
microeconomic
theory, operations research, and linguistics. Of course, we will
seek to emphasize computational perspectives where appropriate.
The class is designed both to provide a survey of this exciting area
for students of computer science, applied mathematics and microeconomics,
and will provide an excellent basis for continued research in this area.
Prerequisites
The stated requirement is Computer Science 181 or 182. A level of comfort
with mathematical formalisms and proofs is required.
Students should
also have familiarity with basic computer science (algorithms, complexity;
e.g., CS 121 and CS 124), and basic probability theory (e.g. Stat 110 or ES 101). Familiarity with mathematical programming (AM 121), game theory (EC 1051 or EC 1052), and classical logic is helpful but not required. Definitely talk to the
instructor after class on Feb 3 if you have any questions. Students with a
background in mathematical economics (e.g. EC 1011a) and an interest in computational issues should be able to appreciate the class materials.
Course Reading
Required text: Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic
and Logical Foundations, by Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton-Brown, Cambridge
University Press 2008. (Available at the COOP)
Course Structure
This class will be mostly lecture-based, but with an intent to faciliate class discussion. Students will be expected to submit comments on the reading before each class, to stress questions that they have about the material and possible areas of discussion. Moreover, there will be two classes dedicated soley to discussion and reflection on the material covered in the class. There will be three problem sets, that will not require any programming. In lieu of a final exam there will be an expositional paper, on a topic of the student's choice.
Students may work in pairs on the problem sets.
| Problem Sets | Available | Due Date |
| Cooperation and Competition | Feb 24 | March 5 |
| Game Theory and Social Choice | March 31 | April 14 |
| Mechanism Design and Logic | April 21 | April 30 |
Expositional paper
In place of a final exam, students will write a short (maximum 10 page)
expositional paper on two related technical papers of their choice that
are related to the course material. The survey must include an exposition
of two formal results in these papers, and must also provide a
critical discussion of assumptions made by the authors along with some
suggestions about future work.
Grading
The final grade in the class will breakdown as: participation and comments 20%,
homeworks 60%, exposition paper 20%.