


Uncertainty, Risk, & Information

➤ Uncertainty



➤ Risk

$$\Pr(\text{cloud}) \quad \Pr(\text{sun})$$

➤ Information

$$\Pr(\text{cloud} \mid \text{info}) \quad \Pr(\text{sun} \mid \text{info})$$

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Uncertainty & Risk, in General

ω_1	ω_2	ω_3		ω_i		
					$\omega_{ \Omega }$	

➤ Ω : State Space


➤ ω are disjoint
exhaustive
states of the world

➤ ω_j : rain tomorrow &
have umbrella & ...

➤ $\Pr(\omega)$

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Uncertainty & Risk, in General



Alternatively,

➤ Overlapping events

❖ E_1 : rain tomorrow

❖ E_2 : have umbrella

➤ $|\Omega|=2^n$

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Preference and Utility

➤ Preference



➤ Utility, $u(\omega)$

$$u(\text{Sun}) = 10 >$$

$$u(\text{Umbrella}) = 8 >$$

$$u(\text{Sun \& Umbrella}) = -4 >$$

$$u(\text{Rain}) = -10$$

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Decision Making Under Uncertainty

- Maximize expected utility

- ❖ $E[u] = \sum_{\omega} \Pr(\omega)u(\omega)$

- Decisions (actions) can affect $\Pr(\omega)$ or $u(\omega)$

					E[u]
Don't Take umbrella	0.5	0	0	0.5	$.5*10 + .5*(-10) = 0$
Take umbrella (but I may leave it at the library)	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	$.25*10 + .25*8 + .25*(-4) + .25*(-10) = 1$

Should take umbrella!

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Utility of Money and Risk Attitude

- Outcomes are \$

- Risk attitude:

- ❖ risk neutral: $u(x) \sim x$

- ❖ risk averse (typical):

- u concave ($u''(x) < 0$ for all x), e.g. $u(x) = \log(x)$

- ❖ risk prone: u convex

- Absolute risk aversion:

$$r_u(x) = -u''(x) / u'(x)$$

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Risk Attitude & Hedging

- I'm risk averse, $u(x) = \log(x)$, insurance company A is risk neutral, $u(x)=x$.

- I believe that my car might be stolen with prob. 0.01

ω_1 : car stolen $u(\omega_1) = \log(10,000)$	ω_2 : car not stolen $u(\omega_2) = \log(20,000)$	$E[u] = .01(4) + .99(4.3)$ $= 4.2980$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ I buy \$10,000 insurance for \$125 		
$u(\omega_1) = \log(19,875)$	$u(\omega_2) = \log(19,875)$	$E[u] = .01(4.2983) + .99(4.2983) = 4.2983$
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Insurance company A also believes $\Pr(\text{car stolen}) = 0.01$ 		
$u(\omega_1) = -9,875$	$u(\omega_2) = 125$	$E[u] = .01(-9875) + .99(125) = 25 > 0$

I am happy to buy insurance. Insurance company A is happy to sell it. The transaction allocates risk.

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Probability and Speculating

- Suppose that I'm also risk neutral, $u(x)=x$.
- But I think that the probability for my car being stolen is much higher than 0.01, say 0.1.
- A \$10,000 car insurance is worth

$$.1(10,000) + .9(0) = \$1,000$$
 to me, but the insurance company only asks for \$125.
Too cheap!
- Buy the insurance, and I get \$825 on expectation.

I am speculating the insurance company.

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Risk-Neutral Probability

- Subjective probability: an agent's personal judgment
 - ❖ Always mixes with the agent's utility (risk attitude)
- Risk neutral probability: the probability that a risk neutral agent has to have the same expected utility

$$\sum_{\omega} \text{Pr}^{\text{RN}}(\omega) u^{\text{RN}}(x_{\omega}) = \sum_{\omega} \text{Pr}(\omega) u(x_{\omega})$$

- Risk neutral probability is the normalized product of subjective probability and marginal utility

$$\text{Pr}^{\text{RN}}(\omega) \sim \text{Pr}(\omega) u'(x_{\omega})$$