CS 286r Syllabus, Spring 2003

This schedule is subject to change. The course has four components:
[BL&WD]Bidding Languages & Winner-determination; [CC&PE]Communication Complexity & Preference Elicitation; [Rep]Reputation mechanisms; [IC]Incentive compatibility.

Lec. No. Date Key Topic Readings Auxiliary Materials Assignments
1 Thur 1/30 Introduction Background reading:
Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling, Wellman et al., Games and Economic Behavior 35:271-303, 2001.
Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination, Andersson et al., in Proc. of the Fourth International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS-00), 2000.
Putting Auction Theory to Workdraft of Chapter 1, by Paul Milgrom (forthcoming).
2 Tue 2/4 Market Design and Auction Variations Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design. Kalagnanam & Parkes, Chapter 10, in Supply Chain Analysis in the eBusiness Era, Edited by David Simchi-Levi, S. David Wu and Z. Max Shen, 2003.
Selling Spectrum Rights, J.McMillan, Journal of Econ. Perspectives, 8(3):145--162, 1994.
3 Thur 2/6 Game Theory Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991, pp.3--44, 209--216, 241--242. PDF PDF due 2/13
4 Tue 2/11 Mechanism Design I: Revelation Principle, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism Design, Parkes, Chapter 2 in PhD dissertation, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 2001.
Mechanism Theory M.Jackson, Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Life Support Stystems. 2000
5 Thur 2/13 Mechanism Design II: Negative and Positive results. Optimal Auction Design, R.Myerson, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981.
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading, Journal of Economic Theory, 28:265-281, 1983.
Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods, Green & Laffont, Econometrica 45:427--438, 1977.
PDF PDF due 2/25
Tue 2/18 No class.
6 Thur 2/20 Auction theory Auctions and bidding, McAfee & McMillan, J. of Economics Literature, 25:699-738, 1987.
Vijay Krishna Auction Theory, Academic Press (2002); pp.1-10, 151-162, 165-184, 223-234, 289-297.
PDF PDF due 3/4
7 Tue 2/25BL&WD Combinatorial auctions: Bidding Languages Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions, Noam Nisan, Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. in Electronic Commerce, 2000. Nicole Immorlica, Derek Yi
8 Thur 2/27BL&WD Combinatorial Auctions: Winner Determination CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions Sandholm et al., Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on AI, 2001.
Integer Programming for Combinatorial Auction Winner Determination. Andersson et al., in Proc. of the Fourth International Conference on Multiagent Systems (ICMAS-00), 2000.
Brian Dillard,Dimah Yanovsky
9 Tue 3/4BL&WD Combinatorial Auctions: Structured Languages Solving Concisely Expressed Combinatorial Auction Problems, C.Boutilier, in Proc. Nat. Conf. on AI, 2002. Jacombo Corbo, Giro Cavallo
10 Thur 3/6CC&PE Combinatorial Auctions: Partial Revelation Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions, W.Conen and T.Sandholm, in AAAI'02 Li Li, Alex Sheh
11 Tue 3/11CC&PE Communication Complexity The Communication Complexity of Efficient Allocation Problems,N.Nisan & S.Segal, Working paper Hebrew University, 2002. Alex Rampell, Kai Kemnitz
12 Thur 3/13 CC&PE Pref Elicit in Multiattribute Auctions Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions, A.Sunderam & D.Parkes, Poster version in Proc. Fourth ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2003. David Chen, Dong Kim
13 Tue 3/18Rep Reputation: eBay Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation mechanisms, Chris Dellarocas, in Proc. 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic commerce (2001)
Reputation Systems, Resnick et al., Comm. ACM 43(12), Dec 2000, 45-48.
James Wang, Yuval Grill
Thur 3/20 No class.
Tue 3/25 Spring break.
Thur 3/27 Spring break.
14 Tue 4/1Rep Markets for Evaluations The Market for Evaluations, Avery et al. American Economic Review 89(3):564-584, 1999 Kenny Fong, Feng Zhu
15 Thur 4/3Rep Eliciting truthful feedback Eliciting Honest Feedback in Electronic Markets, Nolan et al. Working paper presented at SITE'02 Bobby Kleinberg, Jolie Martin
16 Tues 4/8IC Digital Goods Competitive Auctions, Goldberg et al., Submitted, 2002. Rachel Greenstadt, Geoff Goodell
17 Thur 4/10IC Multi-unit Auctions Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions, Kothari et al., in Proc. 4th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2003 Ryan Browne, Saurabh Sanghvi
18 Tue 4/15IC False-name bids A robust open ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol against false-name bidsIwaski et al., in Proc. 4th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2003
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects, Ausubel (2002).
Peter Saldarriaga,Laura Kang, Loizos Michael, Sebastien Lahaie
19 Thur 4/17IC Linked Double Auctions Concurrent Auctions Across the Supply Chain, Babaioff & Nisan, In Proc. 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2001. Jeff Shneidman,Jason Woodard
20 Tue 4/22IC Combinatorial Exchanges Achieving Budget-Balance with VCG-Based Payment Schemes in Combinatorial Exchanges, Parkes, Kalagnanam and Eso, IJCAI'01 Adam Juda and Ed Naim
21 Thur 4/24IC Online auctions Competitive Analysis of Online Auctions Lavi & Nisan, in Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2000 Chris Crick
22 Tues 4/29IC On-line Mechanism Design Pricing WiFi at Starbucks- Issues in Online Mechanism Design, Friedman & Parkes, to appear as a poster paper in Proc. 4th ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, 2003 Eric Barr, Octavian Timaru
23 Thurs 5/1 Conclusions