CS 286r: Computational Mechanism Design

Spring 2005

Professor David C. Parkes

TF: Laura Kang


Final Projects


Michael Monteiro: ¡°An Implementation and Analysis of the Yokoo Protocol¡±


Qicheng Ma: ¡°An Empirical Analysis of Online Mechanisms for a Single Reusable Good¡±


Alfred Galichon: ¡°Consolidation- v. False-name Proofness in Combinatorial Auctions¡±


Haoqi Zhang & Willis Ho: ¡°The Interaction Between Revenue and Efficiency in Truthful Envy-free Auctions¡±


Yan-Cheng Chang: ¡°A Study on Privacy-Preserving Auctions¡±


Victor Shnayder & Eric Budish: ¡°Continuous Combinatorial Exchange with an Application to Course-Swapping Aftermarkets¡±


Laura Serban & Florin Constantin: ¡°The Sensitivity of Competitive Auctions to Prior Information¡±


Geoffrey Mainland: ¡°Inaccurate Priors and Quantized Preferences in Automatically Generated Mechanisms¡±


Danny Goodman: ¡°Monte Carlo Simulation of Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods¡±


David Hammer & Jonathan McPhie: ¡°BitMart: A Set of Auction-Based Protocols for Peer-to-Peer File Exchanges¡±


Gregory Valiant: ¡°Cost of Selfishness¡±


Shaili Jain: ¡°Centralized Network Formation with Self-Interested Agents¡±


Ilan Lobel: ¡°An Empirical Study of the Lavi-Nisan Online Auction¡±


Abe Othman: ¡°Revenue-Maximizing Online Auctions¡±


Kang-Xing Jin and Aditya Sanghvi: ¡°Beyond AdWords: Truthful Contingent-Payment Mechanisms¡±


Shien Jin Ong: ¡°Minimizing Loss of Privacy in Mechanism Design¡±


Pavithra Harsha: ¡°Activity Rule of Budget Constrained Bidders¡±


Jon Bennett: ¡°Deceit in Electronic Auctions: The Devil is in the Externalities¡±


Mohamed Mostagir: ¡°On the Tradeoff between Complexity and Accuracy in Preference Elicitation¡±