CS 286r Syllabus, Spring 2005

This schedule is subject to change.

Lec. No. Date Key Topic Readings Auxiliary Materials Assignments
1 Wed 2/2 Introduction Background reading:
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms, by Rajdeep K Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, and David C. Parkes. In IEEE Intelligent Systems, November 2003, pages 40-47 (Special Issue on Agents and Markets).
Algorithms for Selfish Agents, Noam Nisan, in Proc. 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS'99), pp.1--15, 1999.
Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents, Varian, H., In Proc. USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, July 11-12, 1995, New York.
2 Mon 2/7 Game Theory Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991, pp.3--44, 209--216, 241--242. PDF
PDF Homework 1 out (due 2/14)
Wed 2/9 No class.
3 Mon 2/14 Mechanism Design I: Revelation Principle, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism Design, Parkes, Chapter 2 in PhD dissertation, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 2001.
Mechanism Theory M.Jackson, Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Life Support Stystems. 2000
PDF Homework 1 due
4 Wed 2/16 Mechanism Design II: Negative and Positive results. Optimal Auction Design, R.Myerson, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981.
Efficient mechanism design, Krishna and Perry, Technical Report Penn State University, 2000.
Optimal Auctions, Riley and Samuelson, The American Economic Review, 71(3), 381-392.
PDF PDF Homework 2 out (due 2/23)
Mon 2/21 Holiday.
5 Wed 2/23 Auction theory Appendix of 'Auctions: Theory and Practice' by Paul Klemperer.
Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press (2002); pp.1-10, 151-183, 223-234.
PDF PDFHomework 3 out (due 3/2)
6 Mon 2/28 Truthful Characterization Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions, Lehmann et al., JACM 49(5) Sept. 2002 pp. 577-602 Victor Shnayder PDF
7 Wed 3/2 Truthful Characterization The Characterization of Strategy/False-name Proof Combinatorial Auction Protocols: Price-oriented, Rationing-free Protocol , Makoto Yokoo, 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-2003), 2003. Alfred Galichon PDF
8 Mon 3/7 Truthful Characterization Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions, By Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, and Noam Nisan. Jon Bennett, Florin Constantin PDF
9 Wed 3/9 Auction Design Envy-Free Auctions for Digital Goods, Andrew Goldberg and Jason Hartline, ACM EC 2003. Abe Othman, Haoqi Zhang PDF
10 Mon 3/14 Auction Design Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders, C. Borgs, N. Immorlica, M. Mahdian and A. Saberi, ACM EC 2005. Pavithra Harsha PDF
11 Wed 3/16 Auction Design Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Agents, A. V. Goldberg and J. D. Hartline, MSR-TR-2004-40. Gregory Valiant PDF
12 Mon 3/21 Cryptographic Methods (Im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm, Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 810-817. ACM Press, 2004. Yan-Cheng Chang, Shien Jin Ong PDF
13 Wed 3/23 Auction Design Automated mechanism design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms, Sandholm, T., Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP) 2003. Geoff Mainland PDF
Mon 3/28 Spring break.
Wed 3/30 Spring break.
14 Mon 4/4 Auction Design Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions, Likhodedov, A. and Sandholm, T., Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pp. 232-237, San Jose, California, 2004. Qicheng Ma PDF
15 Wed 4/6 Online Auctions and Mechanisms Mechanism Design for Online Real-Time Scheduling, Ryan Porter, In Proc. ACM EC'04. David Hammer, Kang-Xing Jin PDF
16 Mon 4/11 Online Auctions and Mechanisms Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items, R. Lavi and N. Nisan, To appear in SODA 2005.
Extended Abstract
Shaili Jain, Shien Jin Ong PDF
17 Wed 4/13 Online Auctions and Mechanisms Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods, Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian and David C. Parkes, (Submitted) 2004. Willis Ho PDF
Project Proposals due
18 Mon 4/18 Online Auctions and Mechanisms AdWords and Generalized On-line MatchingAranyak Mehta, Amin Saberi, Umesh Vazirani and Vijay Vazirani, (Submitted) 2005. Laura Serban, Danny Goodman PDF
19 Wed 4/20 Elicitation Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions, Sandholm, T. and Boutilier, C., Chapter 10 of the book Combinatorial Auctions, Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg, eds., MIT Press, 2005. Eric Budish PDF
20 Mon 4/25 Elicitation Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation, Sebastien M. Lahaie and David C. Parkes, In the Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 180-188, May 2004. Michael Monteiro, Aditya Sanghvi PDF
21 Wed 4/27 Elicitation A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions Alex Kress and Craig Boutilier. Mohamed Mostagir, Ilan Lobel PDF
22 Mon 5/2 Elicitation Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, and Rob Shields, Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2004), pp.204--211, San Jose (2004). Jonathan McPhie PDF
23 Wed 5/4 Conclusions PDF