| Lec. No. |
Date |
Key |
Topic |
Readings |
Auxiliary Materials |
Assignments |
| 1 |
Wed 2/2 | |
Introduction |
Background reading:
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms, by Rajdeep K Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, and David C. Parkes.
In IEEE Intelligent Systems, November 2003, pages 40-47 (Special Issue on Agents and Markets).
Algorithms for Selfish Agents, Noam Nisan, in Proc. 16th Annual Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS'99), pp.1--15, 1999.
Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents, Varian, H., In Proc. USENIX
Workshop on Electronic Commerce, July 11-12, 1995, New York.
|
|
|
2 |
Mon 2/7 | |
Game Theory |
Drew Fudenberg and Jean
Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991, pp.3--44, 209--216,
241--242.
|
|
Homework 1 out (due 2/14) |
|
Wed 2/9 | |
No class. |
|
|
|
| 3 |
Mon 2/14 | |
Mechanism Design I: Revelation Principle, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves |
Mechanism Design, Parkes, Chapter 2
in PhD dissertation, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and
Computational Efficiency,
Department of Computer and Information Science, University of
Pennsylvania, May 2001.
Mechanism Theory
M.Jackson, Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Life Support Stystems. 2000
|
|
Homework 1 due |
| 4 |
Wed 2/16 | |
Mechanism Design II: Negative and Positive results. |
Optimal Auction Design, R.Myerson, Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73,
1981.
Efficient mechanism design, Krishna and Perry, Technical Report Penn
State University, 2000.
Optimal Auctions, Riley and Samuelson,
The American Economic Review, 71(3), 381-392.
|
|
Homework 2 out (due 2/23)
|
|
Mon 2/21 | |
Holiday.
|
|
|
| 5 |
Wed 2/23 | |
Auction theory |
Appendix of
'Auctions: Theory and Practice'
by Paul Klemperer.
Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press (2002); pp.1-10, 151-183, 223-234.
|
|
Homework 3 out (due 3/2)
|
| 6 |
Mon 2/28 | |
Truthful Characterization |
Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient
Combinatorial Auctions, Lehmann et al., JACM 49(5) Sept. 2002 pp. 577-602 |
Victor Shnayder |
|
| 7 |
Wed 3/2 | |
Truthful Characterization |
The Characterization of Strategy/False-name Proof
Combinatorial Auction Protocols: Price-oriented, Rationing-free
Protocol
, Makoto Yokoo, 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI-2003), 2003.
| Alfred Galichon |
|
| 8 |
Mon 3/7 | |
Truthful Characterization |
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions,
By Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, and Noam Nisan.
|
Jon Bennett, Florin Constantin |
|
| 9 |
Wed 3/9 | |
Auction Design |
Envy-Free Auctions for Digital Goods, Andrew Goldberg and Jason
Hartline, ACM EC 2003. |
Abe Othman, Haoqi Zhang |
|
| 10 |
Mon 3/14 |
|
Auction Design |
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders,
C. Borgs, N. Immorlica, M. Mahdian and A. Saberi, ACM EC 2005. |
Pavithra Harsha |
|
| 11 |
Wed 3/16 | |
Auction Design |
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Agents, A. V.
Goldberg and J. D. Hartline, MSR-TR-2004-40.
|
Gregory Valiant |
|
| 12 |
Mon 3/21 | |
Cryptographic Methods |
(Im)possibility of unconditionally
privacy-preserving auctions. F. Brandt and T. Sandholm,
Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pages 810-817. ACM Press, 2004.
|
Yan-Cheng Chang, Shien Jin Ong |
|
| 13 |
Wed 3/23 | |
Auction Design |
Automated mechanism design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms, Sandholm, T.,
Proceedings of the International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP) 2003. |
Geoff Mainland |
|
|
Mon 3/28 | |
Spring break. |
|
Wed 3/30 | |
Spring break. |
| 14 |
Mon 4/4 | |
Auction Design |
Methods for Boosting Revenue in
Combinatorial Auctions, Likhodedov, A. and Sandholm, T., Proceedings of the National Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pp. 232-237, San Jose, California, 2004. |
Qicheng Ma |
|
| 15 |
Wed 4/6 | |
Online Auctions and Mechanisms |
Mechanism Design for Online Real-Time Scheduling, Ryan Porter, In Proc. ACM EC'04. |
David Hammer, Kang-Xing Jin |
|
| 16 |
Mon 4/11 | |
Online Auctions and Mechanisms |
Online
Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items,
R. Lavi and N. Nisan, To appear in SODA 2005.
Extended
Abstract
|
Shaili Jain, Shien Jin Ong |
|
| 17 |
Wed 4/13 | |
Online Auctions and Mechanisms |
Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods,
Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian
and David C. Parkes, (Submitted) 2004. |
Willis Ho |
Project Proposals due |
| 18 |
Mon 4/18 | |
Online Auctions and Mechanisms |
AdWords and Generalized On-line MatchingAranyak Mehta, Amin Saberi, Umesh
Vazirani and Vijay Vazirani, (Submitted) 2005.
|
Laura Serban, Danny Goodman |
|
| 19 |
Wed 4/20 | |
Elicitation |
Preference Elicitation in
Combinatorial Auctions, Sandholm, T. and Boutilier, C., Chapter 10 of the book Combinatorial Auctions,
Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg, eds., MIT Press, 2005. |
Eric Budish |
|
| 20 |
Mon 4/25 | |
Elicitation |
Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation, Sebastien M. Lahaie and David C. Parkes, In the Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages
180-188, May 2004. |
Michael Monteiro, Aditya Sanghvi |
|
| 21 |
Wed 4/27 | |
Elicitation |
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
Alex Kress and Craig Boutilier. |
Mohamed Mostagir, Ilan Lobel |
|
| 22 |
Mon 5/2 | |
Elicitation |
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, and Rob Shields, Proceedings of the Nineteenth National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI-2004), pp.204--211, San Jose (2004). |
Jonathan McPhie |
|
| 23 |
Wed 5/4 | |
Conclusions | | |
|