Additional Papers (Note: These papers are not required reading.)

  • Optimal Mechanism for Selling A Set of Commonly Ranked Objects, last revision: 02-06 Joan Feigenbaum
  • Pay-Per-Percentage of Impressions: An Advertising Method that is Highly Robust to Fraud, Joshua Goodman. Presented at the ACM E-Commerce Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions
  • Click Fraud Resistant Methods for Learning Click-Through Rates, by N. Immorlica, K. Jain, M. Mahdian, and K. Talwar. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2005.
  • Quality Uncertainty and the Performance of Online Sponsored Search Markets: An Empirical Investigation. Animesh, Ramachandran, Viswanathan.
  • On Advertiser's Bidding Strategies for Search, Experience, and Credence Goods: an Empirical Investigation. Animesh, Ramachandran, Viswanathan.
  • The Tuzhilin Report analyzing Google's click fraud efforts in the Lane's Gifts vs. Google lawsuit.
  • Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords. Aggarwal, Goel, Motwani.
  • Knapsack Auctions, with Gagan Aggarwal, SODA 2006.
  • Logistic Regression and Collaborative Filtering for Sponsored Search Term Recommendation, Bartz, Murthi, Sebastian.
  • Designing a successful trading agent for supply chain management, by M. He, A. Rogers, X. Luo and N. R. Jennings (2006). Proc. 5th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, Hakodate, Japan, 1159-1166.
  • Dynamics of Bidding in Sponsored Search Auctions: An Analytical Investigation. Kursad Asdemir.
  • Bayesian Optimal No-deficit Mechanism Design, with Shuchi Chawla, R. Ravi, and Uday Rajan. WINE 2006
  • Mechanism Design via Machine Learning, with Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Yishay Mansour, FOCS 2005
  • Approximation Algorithms and Online Mechanisms for Item Pricing, Balcan and Blum
  • Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single Parameter Agents, with Andrew Goldberg, SODA 2005.
  • Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents, J.Bredin, D.C.Parkes and Q.Duong Working paper, 2007. Earlier version appeared in UAI 2005.
  • Online Algorithms for Market Clearing, by Blum, A., Sandholm, T., and Zinkevich, M. 2006. Journal of the ACM, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 845-879.
  • Regrets Only. Online Stochastic Optimization under Time Constraints, R. Bent and P. Van Hentenryck, Proceedings of the 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'04) San Jose, CA, July 2004.
  • Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions, by Takayuki Ito, David Parkes. In the Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS2006), 2006.
  • Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values, by Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito and David Parkes. To appear, Proc. Sixth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems AAMAS'07 (poster).
  • AdWords and generalized on-line matching, by Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, & Vazirani. In Proceedings of the 46th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2005.
  • Spending Constraint Utilities, with Applications to the Adwords. Vazirani
  • Adverse Selection in Online "Trust" Certifications, 2006. Working paper, Harvard University, Ben Edelman
  • Why Phishing Works, Rachna Dhamija, J. D. Tygar and Marti Hearst, to appear in the Proceedings of the Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI2006), 2006.
  • 2004.Designing a Better Shopbot, Montgomery, A., Hosanagar, K., Krishnan, R., Clay, K., Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 2, February
  • Pennies from eBay: the Determinants of Price in Online Auctions, by David Lucking-Reiley, Doug Bryan, Naghi Prasad, and Daniel Reeves. Forthcoming, Journal of Industrial Economics.
  • Field Experiments on the Effects of Reserve Prices in Auctions: More Magic on the Internet, by David H. Reiley. RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2006, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 195-211.
  • The Dynamics of Viral Marketing. Jure Leskovec, Lada Adamic, and Bernardo Huberman, EC'06, Ann Arbor, MI.
  • Matroids, Secretary Problems, and Online Mechanisms, by M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, and R. Kleinberg. To appear in SODA 2007.
  • Game-Theoretic Aspects of Desiging Hyperlink Structures, by N. Immorlica, K. Jain, and M. Mahdian. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2006.
  • Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms, by A. Altman and M. Tennenholtz. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 1-8, 2005.
  • Quantifying Incentive Compatibility of Ranking Systems. With Moshe Tennennholtz. In Proccedings of the Twenty-First National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-06).
  • Incentive Comaptible Ranking Systems. With Moshe Tennennholtz. To appear in Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
  • On the Axiomatic Foundations of Ranking Systems. With Moshe Tennennholtz. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-05).
  • Resnick, Paul, Zeckhauser, Richard, Swanson, John, and Kate Lockwood. The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment. Experimental Economics. Volume 9, Issue 2, Jun 2006, Page 79-101.
  • eBay's Happy Hour: Non-Rational Herding in Online Auctions. Uri Simonsohn Dan Ariely
  • Self-Selection, Slipping, Salvaging, Slacking, and Stoning: the Impacts of Negative Feedback at eBay, by Khopkar, Tapan, Li, Xin, and Resnick, Paul. Proceedings of ACM EC 05 Conference on Electronic Commerce. Vancouver, Canada. 2005, pp. 223-231.
  • Manipulability of PageRank under Sybil Strategies, with A. Cheng, 2006. Proceedings of the First Workshop of Networked Systems (NetEcon06).
  • Sybilproof Reputation Mechanisms, with Alice Cheng. Proceedings of Third Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (2005).
  • Strategic Manipulation of Internet Opinion Forums: Implications for Consumers and Firms.
  • Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard. Information Systems Research, June 2005.
  • Using CHI-Scores to Reward Honest Feedback from Repeated Interactions. by R. Jurca and B. Faltings. Proceedings of AAMAS06, Hakodate, Japan, May 8 - 12, 2006, pp. 1233-1240.
  • Minimum Payments that Reward Honest Reputation Feedback. by R. Jurca and B. Faltings. Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, June 11-15, 2006, pp. 190-199.
  • A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions. Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay Vazirani. Proceedings of the first International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3828: 122-128, Springer 2005.
  • Limitations of VCG-Based Mechanisms, Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan
  • GrowRange: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms, by David C. Parkes and Grant Schoenebeck. In the Proc. 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-04), pages 34-41, 2004
  • Automated markets and trading agents, (JK MacKie-Mason and MPW). Handbook of Computational Economics, vol. 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics.
  • Empirical mechanism design: Methods, with application to a supply chain scenario, (Y Vorobeychik, C Kiekintveld, and MPW) (EC'06).
  • Searching for Walverine, 2005 (MPW, DM Reeves, KM Lochner, and R Suri). in Han La Poutre, Norman Sadeh and Sverker Janson (eds.), Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms, LNAI 3937, pages 157170, Springer-Verlag, 2006.