This schedule is subject to change.
|Lec. No.||Date||Key||Topic||Readings||Auxiliary Materials||Assignments|
|Part 0 -- Introductory Lectures|
General background reading:
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms, by Rajdeep K Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, and David C. Parkes. In IEEE Intelligent Systems, November 2003, pages 40-47 (Special Issue on Agents and Markets).
Algorithms for Selfish Agents, Noam Nisan, in Proc. 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS'99), pp.1--15, 1999.
Mechanism Design for Computerized Agents, Varian, H., In Proc. USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, July 11-12, 1995, New York. Sponsored Search: A Brief History, by Fain and Pedersen. In Proc. Second Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions, ACM EC'06.
|2||Mon 2/5||Game Theory||Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991, pp.3--44, 209--226, 241--242. Yoav Shoham and Kevin Leyton Brown. Multi Agent Systems, Draft 2007. Chapter 4||Homework 1 out|
|3||Wed 2/7||Mechanism Design I||
Mechanism Design, Parkes, Chapter 2
in PhD dissertation, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and
Department of Computer and Information Science, University of
Pennsylvania, May 2001.
Mechanism Theory M.Jackson, Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Life Support Stystems, 2000.
|4||Mon 2/12||Mechanism Design II||
R. Myerson and Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for
Bilateral Trading, JET 1983.
R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan,Two Simplified Proofs for RobertsÕ Theorem, 2004.
|HW 1 due, HW2 out|
|5||Wed 2/14||Auction theory||Appendix of
'Auctions: Theory and Practice'
by Paul Klemperer.
Vijay Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press (2002); pp.1-10, 151-183, 223-234.
|2/19||No Class - President's Day|
|Part I -- Theory and Practice of Mechanism Design||6||2/21||Truthful Characterization||Weak Monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant strategy implementation.by S. Bikhchandani, S. Chatterji, R. Lavi, A. Mu'alem, N. Nisan, and A. Sen. To appear in Econometrica.||
||HW 2 due|
Optimal Auction Design,
Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6(1), pp. 58
Lectures on Optimal Mechanism Design, by Jason Hartline, April 2006 p. 1--12.
|8||2/28||Truthful Characterization||Truthful Approximation Mechanisms for Restricted Combinatorial Auctions, by Ahuva Mu'alem and Noam Nisan In AAAI-02.|
|9||3/5||Competitive AuctionsAndrew Goldberg, Jason Hartline Anna Karlin, Mike Saks, and Andrew Wright, Games and Economic Behavior, 2006.||Levin|
Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions,
. In Proceedings of the
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2005. Likhodedov, A. and
Sandholm, T. and Gilpin, A. 2006.Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions without Full Valuation Revelation. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS'06).
|11||3/12||Single-Value Combinatorial Auctions and Implementation in Undominated Strategies, Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi and Elan Pavlov. In ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2006 (SODA'06): 1054-1063.||Lapets|
|12||3/14||Incremental Mechanism Design, Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. To appear in Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-07), Hyderabad, India, 2007.||Tang|
|Part II -- Sponsored Search and Bidding Agent Design|
|13||3/19||Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz. American Economic Review, 2006.||Chang||14||3/21||
Revenue Analysis of a Family of Ranking Rules for Keyword
Auctions. Sebastien Lahaie and David Pennock. Working paper, Harvard
and Yahoo, 2006.
Implementing Sponsored Search in Web Search Engines: Computational Evaluation of Alternative Mechanisms by Jane Feng, Hemant Bhargava, David M. Pennock Informs Journal on Computing, to appear.
Greedy Bidding Strategies for Keyword Auctions. Matthew Cary, Aparna Das, Ben Edelman, Ioannis Giotis, Kurtis Heimerl, Anna Karlin, Claire Mathieu, and Michael Schwarz. Eighth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), June 2007, to appear.
Strategic Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions. Edelman, Ostrovsky. DSS forthcoming [v.short]
Empirical game-theoretic analysis of the TAC market games, by M.Wellman, PR Jordan, C
Kiekintveld, J Miller, and DM Reeves. AAMAS-06 Workshop on
Game-Theoretic and Decision-Theoretic Agents, 2006.
Searching for Walverine 2005, by MPW, DM Reeves, KM Lochner, and R Suri. in Han La Poutre, Norman Sadeh and Sverker Janson (eds.), Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Designing Trading Agents and Mechanisms, LNAI 3937, pages 157170, Springer-Verlag, 2006.
I. Vetsikas, N. R. Jennings and B. Selman (2007)
Generating Bayes-Nash equilibria to design autonomous trading agents
Proc 20th Int. Joint Conf. on AI (IJCAI), Hyderabad, India.
Toulis P., Kehagias D., Mitkas P.: Mertacor: A Successful Autonomous Trading Agent in 5th Intl. Joint Conference on Autonous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS06), Hakodate, Japan, 8-12 May, 2006.
|Part III -- Dynamic Mechanisms|
|18||4/11||D. C. Parkes,Online mechanisms. To appear as Chapter 16 in "Algorithmic Game Theory", edited by N.Nisan, T.Roughgarden, E.Tardos and V.Vazirani, Cambridge University Press (2007).||Seuken,
|19||4/16||Reducing Truth-telling Online Mechanisms to Online Optimization, by Baruch Awerbuch, Yossi Azar, and Adam Meyerson, Proceedings of ACM STOC 2003.||Lapets,
|20||4/18||Online Ascending Auctions for Gradually Expiring Items, by Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan.||Chen|
Online Stochastic Optimization without
Distributions.Russell Bent and Pascal Van Hentenryck. Proceeding of
the 15th International Conference on Automated Planning &
Scheduling,(ICAPS'05) Monterey, CA, June 2005.
The Value of Consensus in Online Stochastic Scheduling, Russell Bent and Pascal Van Hentenryck, Proceeding of the 14th International Conference on Automated Planning & Scheduling, Whistler, British Columbia, Canada, June 3-7 2004.
|22||4/25||Mallesh Pai and Rakesh Vohra. Optimal Dynamic Auctions Working paper, Northwestern University.||Seuken, Corbo|
|23||4/30||An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains, David C. Parkes and Quang Duong, To appear, Proc. 22nd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-07), 2007.||Yamangil|