| Lec. No. |
Date |
Key |
Topic |
Readings |
Auxiliary Materials |
Assignments |
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General Background Reading |
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Background |
Mechanism
Design for Computerized Agents, by H. Varian, In Proc. USENIX
Workshop on Electronic Commerce, July 11-12, 1995, New York.
Sponsored Search: A Brief History, by D. C. Fain and J. O. Pedersen.
In Proc. Second Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions, ACM EC'06.
Putting Auction Theory to Work by P. Milgrom, Chapter 1 in Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press (2004).
A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot
Allocation by S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith and R. L. Bulfin
in The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 402-417
Scientific
Background for 2007 Nobel In Economic Sciences for mechanism design
theory to Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson |
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Introductory Lectures |
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| 1 |
Tuesday Sep-23 | |
Game Theory and Introduction to Mechanism Design |
Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory:
Games in Normal Form, by Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown, Chapter 3
in Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations, Cambridge University Press, to appear October 2008.
Mechanism Theory
M. O. Jackson, Chapter in Encyclopedia of Life Support Stystems,
U. Derigs (ed.), 2003.
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Lecture 1 notes 
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Assignment 1 out (due sep-30)
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| 2 |
Tuesday Sep-30 | |
Mechanism Design:
Characterizations, Computational concerns |
Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists), by N. Nisan. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani,
editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 9. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Combinatorial Auctions,
by L. Blumrosen and N. Nisan. In N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. Vazirani,
editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, chapter 11. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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Lecture 2 notes
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Assignment 2 out (due oct-7)
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| 3 |
Tuesday Oct-7 | |
Auctions: Some theory and Computation |
Lectures on
Optimal Mechanism Design,
(p.1-12 only)
by J. Hartline.
Auction
Theory: A Guide to the Literature, by P.
Klemperer in Journal of
Economic Surveys 1999, 13 (3), 227-286.
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Lecture 3 notes
Myerson analysis
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Assignment 3 out (due oct-14)
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4 |
Tuesday Oct-14 | |
Keyword auctions |
Online
Mechainsms. By David C. Parkes, In Algorithmic
Game Theory, edited by N.Nisan, T.Roughgarden, E.Tardos and
V.Vazirani,
Cambridge University Press (2007).
Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions
of dollars worth of keywords. By B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz. in American Economic Review, 97(1):242-259, March 2007.
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GSP analysis
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Seminar style: Class dicussion |
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5 |
Tuesday Oct-21 | |
Bid Dynamics |
On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions. By M. Cary, A. Das, B. Edelman, I. Giotis, K. Heimerl, A. Karlin, C. Mathieu and M. Schwarz. HBS Working Paper No. 08-056. 2008.
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions.
By C. Borgs, J. Chayes, O. Etesami, N. Immorlica, K. Jain, and M. Mahdian.
In Proc. WWW'07.
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best-response analysis
Cary et al.
Borgs et al.
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Ludek Cigler and Thomas Leaute
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| 6 |
Tuesday Oct-28 | |
Model refinements |
A Cascade Model for Externalities in Sponsored Search. By D. Kempe and
M. Mahdian, in Proc. Fourth Workshop on Sponsored Search, at
ACMEC'08 (Forthcoming in WINE'08).
Sponsored Search Auctions with Markovian Users By G. Aggarwal, J. Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan and M. Pal, in Proc. Fourth Workshop on Sponsored Search, at ACMEC'08.
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Aggarwal et al.
Kempe and Mahdian
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Brammert Ottens and Florent Garcin
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| 7 |
Tuesday Nov-4 | |
Auction Design (I) |
General Auction Mechanism for Search Advertising by G. Aggarwal, S. Muthukrishnan, D. Pal and M. Pal.
Working paper, Google.
Mechanism
Design without Money By James Schummer and Rakesh Vohra in
Algorithmic Game Theory, Nisan et al. (eds), Cambridge University
Press (2007) 10.3 and 10.4 only
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Class notes
Hungarian method
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Thomas Hofer and Paul Dutting
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| 8 |
Tuesday Nov-11 | |
Auction Design (II) |
Simplified Mechanisms with Applications to Sponsored Search and
Package Auctions, by P. Milgrom, Technical Report, Stanford University,
October 2007.
Core-Selecting Auctions by B. Day and P. Milgrom, in International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 2008, 393-407.
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Day and Milgrom
Milgrom
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Hajir Roozbehani and Dong Han
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| 9 |
Tuesday Nov-18 | |
More expressiveness |
An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display
Advertising by S. Lahaie, D. C. Parkes and D. M. Pennock. In Proc. National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2008.
Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing by C. Boutilier, D. C. Parkes, T. Sandholm and W. E. Walsh in Proc. of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2008.
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Lahaie et al.
Boutilier et al.
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Tong Zhang, Li Pu and Alex Susu
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| 10 |
Tuesday Nov-25 |
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Dynamic VCG Mechanisms |
The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism by D. Bergemann and J. Valimaki. Working
paper, Cowles Foundation (August 2008).
Learning About The Future and Dynamic Efficiency,
by A. Gershkov and B. Moldovanu, forthcoming in American Economic Review
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Project proposals due
Bergemann and Valimaki
Gershkov and Moldovanu
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Hajir Roozbehani and Dong Han
Ludek Cigler and Thomas Leaute
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| 11 |
Tuesday Dec-2 | |
Dynamic Auctions |
Self-Correcting Sampling-Based Dynamic Multi-Unit
Auctions
by F. Constantin and D. C. Parkes, Working paper, Harvard University (2008).
Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising, by H. Nazerzadeh, A. Saberi, and R. Vohra in Proc. WWW 2008.
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Constantin and Parkes
Nazerzadeh et al.
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Tong Zhang and Li Pu
Brammert Ottens and Florent Garcin
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| 12 |
Tuesday Dec-9 | |
Budget constraints |
Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, by M. Pai and R. Vohra, Working Paper Kellogg School of Management, 2008.
Multi-unit Auctions with budget limits by S. Dobzinski, R. Lavi, and
N. Nisan. FOCS 2008.
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Vohra
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Paul Dutting and Thomas Hofer
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| 13 |
Tuesday Dec-16 | |
Student presentations |
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Duetting and Hofer
Leaute
Garcin and Pu
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Thursday Jan-8 | |
| Final papers due |
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