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Overview
Reading
Lecture Notes
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Overview
Mechanism design is the problem of designing a distributed protocol
that will implement a particular objective despite the self-interest
of individual agents. Chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation, with links
below, review classic mechanism design and computational mechanism
design. In computational mechanism design the idea is to maintain
useful economic properties but also achieve useful computational
properties.
Reading
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[PS]
[PDF]
Parkes 01
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David Parkes.
Classic Mechanism Design.
Chapter 2, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
This chapter provides a brief introduction to game theory, and then
introduces important concepts in mechanism design. The revelation
principle, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, and important
Impossibility and Possibility results are all discussed at some
length.
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[PS]
[PDF]
Parkes 01
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David Parkes.
Computational Mechanism Design.
Chapter 3, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
The focus of this chapter is on the Generalized Vickrey Auction, and
combinatorial allocation problems. In particular, I consider
approaches to address the computational complexity of winner
determination, the valuation complexity of participation in an
auction, and the communication costs of different mechanisms.
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[PDF]
DJP03
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Rajdeep Dash, Nicholas Jennings and David Parkes.
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
in IEEE Intelligent Systems, November 2003, pages 40-47 (Special Issue on Agents and Markets).
An overview of computational mechanism design, designed for
researchers in multi-agent systems. Suggests future research
directions.
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Lecture Notes
Links
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