Radcliffe Seminar on Revealed and Latent Preferences: Economic and Computational
Approaches
May 14-15, 2004, Radcliffe Institute, Cambridge MA
Unless otherwise stated, all activities will be in the Gilman Room, Agassiz House, in Radcliffe Yard. 10 Garden Street, Cambridge MA
Directions
Overview
This event will bring together a small group of
researchers with diverse backgrounds that are interested in the interplay
between preference elicitation and bounded-rationality. Specifically, we
hope the seminar will allow researchers from within computer science
and economics to discuss methodologies and theories for bounded-rational
actions and behaviors.
Part of the agenda is to understand the implications for preference
elicitation, which is often a first step in understanding the economic
implications of policy decisions and of economic mechanism design.
The seminar will be organized around overview talks about
methodologies from different fields, but with plenty of time devoted to
free-flowing discussion.
We invite your suggestions on the content and
form of this two-day workshop.
Schedule
Friday, May 14.
| 9:00 a.m. - 9:30 a.m. | Continental breakfast |
|
9.30-9.45am | Opening Remarks |
| 9.45-10.45am | Craig Boutilier: "Computational Procedures for Optimization and Elicitation with Uncertain Preferences"
|
| 10.45-11.15am | Coffee Break |
| 11.15-12.15pm | Chris Shannon: "What to Optimize if you Must." |
| 12.15-1.30pm | Lunch, Cronkhite Graduate Center Living Room, 6
Ash Street |
| 1.30-3pm | Decision theory Short Presentations: Jon Doyle, Andrea Wilson,
Peter Haddawy, Jerry Green, David Parkes |
| 3-3.30pm | Coffee Break |
| 3.30-5pm | Discussion: Preference Elicitation
Methods |
| 6.00pm | Group Dinner -
Sandrines, 6.30pm, 8 Holyoke Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Ph: 617-497-5300 |
Saturday, May 15.
| 8:30 a.m. - 9:00 a.m. | Continental Breakfast |
|
|
| 9-10.30am | Game theory Short Presentations: Attila Ambrus, Drew Fudenberg, Avi Pfeffer, Kate Larson, David Laibson |
| 10.30-11am | Coffee Break |
| 11-12.15pm | Discussion: Latent Preferences
vs. Revealed Preferences |
|
12.15-1.30pm | Lunch |
| 1.30-2.30pm | David Laibson: The Psychology of Preference Elicitation |
| 2.30-3pm | Closing Discussion
|
Relevant Papers by Participants
- Eliciting Bid Take Non-Price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields (2004)
- Regret-Based Utility Elicitation in Constraint-Based Decision Problems, Craig Boutilier, Relu Patrascu, Pascal Poupart, Dale Schuurmans (2004)
- Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, James
Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick (2001)
- Prospects for Preferences,
Jon Doyle (2004)
- Rules of Thumb for Social Learning, Glenn Ellison and Drew Fudenberg (1993)
- Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (1994)
- Competition and Consumer Confusion,
Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson (2004)
- Learning Social Preferences
in Games, Ya'akov Gal, Avi Pfeffer, Francesca Marzo, Barbara Grosz (2004)
- Reasoning about Rationality and Beliefs, Ya'akov Gal and Avi Pfeffer (2004)
- What
to Maximize if You MustAviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon and Yossi Speigel (November, 2003)
- Preference Elicitation via Theory Refinement,
P. Haddawy, V. Ha, A. Restificar, B. Geisler, J. Miyamoto (2003)
-
Similarity of Personal Preferences: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical
Analysis, V. Ha and P. Haddawy
- Apply Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation, Sebastien Lahaie and David C. Parkes (March, 2004)
- Strategic Deliberation and Truthful Revelation: An Impossibility Result, Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm (2004)
- Bidders with Hard Valuation Problems, Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm (2004)
- Efficient Utility Functions for Ceteris Paribus Preferences, Michael McGeachie and Jon Doyle (2002)
- Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation, David Parkes (2003)
- Bounded Memory and Biases in
Information Processing, Andrea Wilson (May, 2004)
Presentations
- Attila Ambrus, Interaction between
selfish and conditionally altruistic players- a model suggested by
public good experiments
- Craig Boutilier, Computational
procedures for optimization and elicitation with uncertain
preferences
- Jon Doyle, Preferences in Reasoning
- Drew Fudenberg, Economists' Models of Learning
- Jerry Green, Ecomomics at a Crossroads
- Peter Haddawy, Using Prior Knowledge to
Reduce the Cost of Elicitation
- David Laibson, The Psychology of Preference
Elicitation
- Kate Larson, Mechanism Design and Computationally-Limited Agents
- David Parkes, Efficient Elicitation with Costly Queries
- Avi Pfeffer, Representing Agents' Beliefs,
Preferences and Decision-Making Prcoesses
- Andrea Wilson, Bounded Memory and Biases in
Information Processing
Participants
PROF. ATTILA AMBRUS
Harvard University
Economics Department
1805 Cambridge St., #309
E: ambrus@fas.harvard.edu
ASSAF BEN-SHOHAM
Graduate Student
Harvard University
Economics Department
Cambridge, MA 02138
E: shoham@fas.harvard.edu
PROF. CRAIG BOUTILIER
University of Toronto
Dept. of Computer Science
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G5
Canada
E: cebly@cs.toronoto.edu
JACOMO CORBO
Doctoral Student
Harvard University
Div. of Engineering & Applied Sciences
33 Oxford Street, Room 238
Cambridge MA 02138
E: corbo@fas.harvard.edu
PROF. JON DOYLE
North Carolina State University
Dept. of Computer Science
Venture III, #173
900 Main Campus Dr.
Raleigh, NC 8207
E: jon_doyle@ncsu.edu
PROF. DREW FUDENBERG
Harvard University
Economics Department
Littauer 310
Cambridge MA 02138
E: dfudenberg@harvard.edu
KOBI GAL
Doctoral Student
Div. of Engineering & Applied Sciences
33 Oxford Street, Room 217
Cambridge MA 02138
E: gal@eecs.harvard.edu
PROF. JERRY GREEN
Harvard Business School
Negotiation, Organizations, & Markets
Baker Library 266
Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
E: jgreen@hbs.edu
PROF. PETER HADDAWY
Asian Institute of Technology
P. O. Box 4
Klong Luang, Pathumthani 12120
Thailand
E: haddawy@ait.ac.th
DANIEL HOJMAN
Graduate Student
Harvard University
Economics Department
Cambridge, MA 02138
E: hojman@fas.harvard.edu
LAURA KANG
Doctoral Student
Harvard University
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
2 Peabody Terrace, #1002
Cambridge, MA 02138
E: kang@eecs.harvard.edu
SEBASTIEN LAHAIE
Doctoral Student
Harvard University
Div. of Engineering & Applied Sciences
33 Oxford Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
E: slahaie@eecs.harvard.edu
PROF. DAVID LAIBSON
Harvard University
Department of Economics
Littauer M-14
Cambridge, MA 02138
E: dlaibson@harvard.edu
Dr. KATE LARSON
Carnegie Mellon University
Dept. of Computer Science
5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
E: klarson@cs.cmu.edu
LOIZOS MICHAEL
Harvard University
Div. of Engineering & Applied Sciences
33 Oxford Street, Room 215
Cambridge MA 02138
E: loizos@eecs.harvard.edu
MICHAEL MCGEACHIE
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02139
E: mmcgeach@csail.mit.edu
PROF. DAVID PARKES
Harvard University
Div. of Engineering & Applied Sciences
33 Oxford Street, Room 229
Cambridge MA 02138
E: parkes@eecs.harvard.edu
PROF. AVI PFEFFER
Harvard University
Div. of Engineering & Applied Sciences
33 Oxford Street, Room 251
Cambridge MA 02138
E: pfeffer@fas.harvard.edu
LAURA SERBAN
Undergraduate
Harvard University
Computer Science Department
Cambridge, MA 02138
E: serban@fas.harvard.edu
PROF. CHRIS SHANNON
University of California
Department of Economics
549 Evans Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
E: cshannon@econ.berkeley.edu
PROF. ANDREA WILSON
University of Chicago
Department of Economics
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
E: awilson@uchicago.edu
Organizers
Jerry Green, John Leverett Professor in the University,
David A. Wells Professor of Political Economy
David Parkes, Assistant Professor of Computer Science
Avi Pfeffer, Assistant Professor of Computer Science
Contact
David Parkes, parkes@eecs.harvard.edu