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Dissertation
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David C. Parkes.
Classic Mechanism Design.
Chapter 2, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
This chapter provides a brief introduction to game theory, and then
introduces important concepts in mechanism design. The revelation
principle, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, and important
Impossibility and Possibility results are all discussed at some
length.
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David C. Parkes.
Computational Mechanism Design.
Chapter 3, Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
The focus of this chapter is on the Generalized Vickrey Auction, and
combinatorial allocation problems. In particular, I consider
approaches to address the computational complexity of winner
determination, the valuation complexity of participation in an
auction, and the communication costs of different mechanisms.
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Brief survey article
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Rajdeep Dash, Nicholas Jennings and David C. Parkes.
Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
in IEEE Intelligent Systems, November 2003, pages 40-47 (Special Issue on Agents and Markets).
An overview of computational mechanism design, designed for
researchers in multi-agent systems. Suggests future research
directions.
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Book chapters
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David C. Parkes. Online Mechanisms
in Algorithmic Game Theory, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos and Vijay Vazirani (eds.),
Chapter 16, Cambrige University Press, 2007.
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[PDF]
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David C. Parkes. Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
in Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.) , Chapter 2,
MIT Press,
2006
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[PDF]
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Jayant Kalagnanam and David C. Parkes. Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design
in Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling in the E-Business Era,
David Simchi-Levi, S.
David Wu,
and Max Shen (eds.), Chapter 5, Kluwer, 2004.
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