Display Advertising Auctions with Arbitrage*

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Abstract

Online display advertising exchanges connect web publishers with advertisers seeking to place ads. In many cases the advertiser obtains value from an ad impression (a viewing by a user) only if it is clicked, and frequently advertisers prefer to pay contingent on this occurring. But at the same time many publishers demand payment independent of click. Arbitragers with good estimates of click-probabilities can resolve this conflict by absorbing the risk and acting as intermediary, paying the publisher on allocation and being paid only if a click occurs. This paper examines the incentives of advertisers and arbitragers and contributes an efficient mechanism with truthful bidding by the advertisers and truthful reporting of click predictions by arbitragers as dominant strategies while, given that a hazard rate condition is satisfied, yielding increased revenue to the publisher. We provide empirical evidence based on bid data from Yahoo!’s Right Media Exchange suggesting that the mechanism would increase revenue in practice.

1 Introduction

Advertising exchanges, such as Yahoo!’s Right Media, Google’s AdX, AppNexus and OpenX, are an increasingly common and important mechanism for allocating display advertising. In these exchanges, an advertiser such as an automobile company will bid to put its ad on web pages, such as those from news outlets or car magazines. The particular mechanisms used by these exchanges vary. In all cases, however, a loading web page calls an exchange for an ad, the exchange then holds an automated auction, chooses the highest eligible bidder, and assigns that bidder’s ad to the web page. Confusingly, both the call for the ad and the ad on the page are known as an “impression.” Many advertisers pay by the impression (cost per impression or “CPM”), and generally the publisher (web page) would prefer to be paid by the impression. However, advertisers often prefer to pay only when their ad is clicked, known as CPC or cost per click payments.

The preference of advertisers to pay for clicks conflicts with the desire of publishers to be paid by the impression. Advertisers want to pay by the click because they

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cannot observe the quality of the inventory they are buying and are suspicious that they will be charged for low quality, non-converting impressions; they only want to pay for the quality they receive. Similarly, publishers want to ensure they receive payment for the quality they provide. For uninformed publishers the restriction to CPM payment is fundamental: without having good estimates of click-probabilities for the various advertisers, a publisher cannot even identify a sensible CPC payment scheme (what should the per-click prices be?). To bridge this gap, third party companies have emerged that guarantee clicks to advertisers, while making per impression payments to the publishers. In this work we propose mechanisms for bringing the click-prediction expertise of these companies directly into the exchange by abstracting them as arbitrage agents. The arbitrager forecasts the probability of a click, which allows the construction of an expected or average price per impression, namely the bid times the probability of a click. The arbitrager is then paid when the ad is clicked and pays the publisher some amount per impression. We provide mechanisms that establish incentives for all parties—arbitragers, publishers and advertisers—to bid truthfully, leading to maximal exchange efficiency.

Given the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem [Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983], it would be surprising if efficient mechanisms for handling arbitrage exist. However, we show that when the common hazard rate assumption obtains, we can construct a mechanism that provides dominant strategies to both the advertiser and the arbitrager and which yields a revenue increase for the publisher over not accepting the arbitrager’s bid. This mechanism is straightforward to implement and does not depend on specific details of the distribution of values. As such, it is a natural candidate for use in an exchange. The mechanism’s simplicity is important because many billions of auctions are carried out daily.

After providing an outline of related work, we present the main results of the paper in Section 2: we provide an efficient mechanism and analyze the revenue and efficiency it yields in comparison with a CPC-bidder-excluding approach. In Section 3 we present two alternative mechanisms that are inefficient but have the advantage of always (weakly) increasing revenue and efficiency over the CPC-bidder-excluding solution. In Section 4 we generalize the model and results with respect to the number of CPC-bidders and arbitragers. In Section 5 we use real bid data from Yahoo!’s Right Media Exchange to evaluate, retrospectively and hypothetically, the revenue and efficiency impact of moving to our efficient mechanism. In Section 6 we conclude.

1.1 Related work

There is an extensive theory of arbitrage in asset markets, see e.g. Merton [1987] or Fama and French [2004] for an overview. Arbitrage in asset markets is generally risk-free, where the present analysis involves risk-shifting. There are also extensive analyses of risk-shifting based on risk aversion, e.g. Arrow [1971]. We study risk-shifting based

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1 Some advertisers prefer to pay only when they make a sale, or some other action is taken, known as cost per action or CPA, as sales are an even more relevant outcome. For convenience we frame the environment in terms of CPC-demanding advertisers, but the same analysis holds for advertisers who are only willing to pay CPA (assuming actions are observable to the publisher).
on expertise—a party able to forecast an event more accurately is the natural candidate for taking the risk of the action.

We focus specifically on display advertising on the Internet. An increasing share of such ad impressions are sold via ad exchanges, which facilitate the sale of billions of impressions per day, see the survey by Muthukrishnan [2009] for a complete description of advertising exchanges. Previous work has considered aspects of the mechanism design problem faced by the ad exchange. Chakraborty et al. [2010] consider the problem faced by the central exchange when the bidders have additional constraints that limit the number of auctions they can participate in. The authors develop a joint optimization framework to decide whom to solicit bids from at each step. Feldman et al. [2010] investigate the setting of auctions with intermediaries, where the individual bidders must purchase the good not from the seller directly, but rather through a self-interested intermediate third party. They design optimal auctions in this setting and analyze the resulting equilibria. Both of these situations are quite different from our setting where the goal is to design mechanisms to incorporate CPC-CPM arbitrage agents into the exchange in an efficient and revenue-positive manner.

In their work on arbitraging in sponsored search markets, Bu et al. [2008] explore a different setting for arbitrage, namely content match publishers (for example, Google’s AdSense or Yahoo!’s Content Match) attracting additional traffic by means of search advertising. In contrast to our work, they are not interested in enabling these kinds of arbitragers, but rather analyze the strategies and equilibria in these settings.

2 An efficient solution

We proceed directly to the main contribution of the paper: a mechanism that achieves efficiency in dominant strategies, and a proof that for distributions satisfying a hazard rate condition the expected revenue impact of adopting it over the CPC-bidder-excluding option is positive. We consider a simplified model in which there is a single impression to be allocated, a set of CPM-bidders $I$, a single CPC-bidder who obtains value only if the impression is clicked, and a single arbitrager who knows the true probability $p^*$ with which the CPC-bidder’s ad would be clicked were it to be shown. The single-CPC-bidder and single-arbitrager restrictions are not very significant, as we will see in Section 4 when we address the general case, but will make the exposition clearer.

The mechanism elicits reported values (bids) from each advertiser, and predicted probability-of-click from the arbitrager. We assume $p^*$ is strictly positive, and so the mechanism will not admit a claim that $p^* = 0$. For any vector $b$ of real numbers we let $b^{(k)}$ denote the $k^{th}$ highest value in $b$.

**Definition 1.** (SECOND PRICE FOR ALL (SP) MECHANISM) The CPC-bidder announces a value-per-click $\hat{v}$, the arbitrager announces a probability-of-click $\hat{p}$ for the CPC-bidder’s ad, and each CPM-bidder $i \in I$ announces a value-per-impression $b_i$, with $b$ denoting the vector of CPM bids.

- If $\hat{p}\hat{v} < b^{(1)}$, the impression is allocated to bidder $\arg\max_{i \in I} b_i$ who pays $\max\{\hat{p}\hat{v}, b^{(2)}\}$ (ties can be broken arbitrarily).
If \( \hat{p}v \geq b^{(1)} \), the impression is allocated to the CPC-bidder and the arbitrager pays the highest CPM bid, \( b^{(1)} \). If the impression is clicked, additionally the arbitrager is paid \( \hat{v} \) and the CPC-bidder pays \( \frac{b^{(1)}}{\hat{p}} \).

We illustrate the mechanism on the following simple example: there are two CPM-bidders who announce bids \$0.04 and \$0.06; the CPC-bidder announces value \$0.90; and the arbitrager announces probability of click 0.1. The impression will be allocated to the CPC-bidder (since \( 0.1 \cdot \$0.90 > \$0.06 \)) and the arbitrager will pay \$0.06. If the CPC-bidder’s advertisement is clicked, then additionally the arbitrager will be paid \$0.90 and the CPC-bidder will pay \$0.60.

An efficient allocation is one in which the bidder with highest expected value receives the impression; the SP mechanism achieves efficient allocations in dominant strategies.

**Theorem 1.** The SP mechanism is truthful and efficient in dominant strategies.

**Proof.** We will show that no agent can ever gain by bidding other than his true value (strategyproofness), which, given the allocation rule, entails dominant strategy efficiency. For every CPM bidder strategyproofness is immediate because the auction faced is a standard Vickrey auction.

Considering the CPC-bidder and the arbitrager, whether they win the auction depends on the product of their reports. First take the CPC-bidder’s perspective and consider arbitrary report \( \hat{p} \) for the arbitrager and any bids \( b \) by the CPM-bidders. The CPC-bidder obtains value \( v^* \) on click and 0 otherwise. Conditional on being allocated the impression his expected utility will be:

\[
p^* \left( v^* - \frac{b^{(1)}}{\hat{p}} \right)
\]

(1)

Given an allocation decision, the payment the CPC-bidder makes is independent of his bid, and, given Expression (1), his utility is maximized by being allocated the impression if and only if \( v^* \geq b^{(1)}/\hat{p} \). Reporting \( \hat{v} = v^* \) achieves this, and thus truthful reporting is a dominant strategy.

Now take the arbitrager’s perspective and consider arbitrary bid \( \hat{v} \) for the CPC-bidder and bids \( b \) by the CPM-bidders. If allocated the impression the arbitrager obtains expected utility \( p^* \hat{v} - b^{(1)} \) (he pays \( b^{(1)} \) for sure and receives \( \hat{v} \) with probability \( p^* \)). Given an allocation decision, the payment he receives is independent of his bid, and therefore the arbitrager’s utility is maximized if he is allocated the impression if and only if \( p^* \hat{v} \geq b^{(1)} \). Reporting \( \hat{p} = p^* \) achieves this, and thus truthful reporting is a dominant strategy.

Note that in the truthful dominant strategy equilibrium the expected revenue to the publisher, conditional on allocation to the CPC-bidder, equals:

\[
b^{(1)} + p^* \left( \frac{b^{(1)}}{p^*} - v^* \right)
\]

(2)

\[
= 2b^{(1)} - p^* v^*
\]

(3)

Conditional on allocation to a CPM-bidder, equilibrium revenue equals \( \max\{p^* v^*, b^{(2)}\} \).
2.1 Revenue and efficiency implications

Theorem 1 tells us that the SP mechanism is ideal with respect to efficiency, but we need also to consider the revenue impact of folding a CPC-bidder and arbitrager into the system in the way proposed. Assume all aggregate payments taken in by the mechanism are given to the publisher; the publisher would benefit from moving to the SP mechanism from a second-price auction that excludes the CPC-bidder if doing so will lead to increased expected revenue. Without allowing CPC-bidders, revenue would always equal \( b^{(2)} \). Then allowing a CPC-bidder, in the case where the CPC-bidder wins (i.e., when \( p^*v^* \geq b^{(1)} \)), the change in resulting revenue equals:

\[
2b^{(1)} - p^*v^* - b^{(2)}
\]

Whether or not this is positive in expectation depends on the distribution from which values are drawn. But there is another factor: when the CPC-bidder/arbitrager submit the second highest bid, this increases revenue (with certainty) over what it would have been if they were excluded. Specifically, when \( b^{(1)} > p^*v^* > b^{(2)} \), the change in resulting revenue from including them equals:

\[
p^*v^* - b^{(2)}
\]

Then the total change in expected revenue from allowing the CPC-bidder/arbitrager and moving to the SP mechanism from the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding approach equals:

\[
Pr(p^*v^* \geq b^{(1)}) \mathbb{E}[2b^{(1)} - p^*v^* - b^{(2)} | p^*v^* \geq b^{(1)}] + Pr(b^{(1)} > p^*v^* > b^{(2)}) \mathbb{E}[p^*v^* - b^{(2)} | b^{(1)} > p^*v^* > b^{(2)}]
\]

Now to make things precise, assume there are \( n - 1 \) CPM-bidders and one CPC-bidder, and assume \( p^*v^* \) and every CPM bid is drawn independently from the same distribution, with p.d.f. \( f \) and c.d.f. \( F \). There is a \( 1/n \) chance of the CPC-bidder having the highest bid and a \( 1/n \) chance of him having the second highest bid. Then letting \( E_k \) denote the expected value of the \( k \)th highest draw from the distribution, the expected revenue gain spelled out in Eqs. (6–7) reduces to:

\[
\frac{1}{n}(2E_2 - E_1 - E_3) + \frac{1}{n}(E_2 - E_3)
\]

This can be expressed:

\[
\frac{1}{n} \left[ 3 \int n(n-1)f(x)(1 - F(x))F(x)^{n-2}x \, dx - \int nf(x)F(x)^{n-1}x \, dx \right] - 2 \int \frac{n(n-1)(n-2)}{2} f(x)(1 - F(x))^2 F(x)^{n-3}x \, dx
\]

\[= 3(n-1) \int f(x)(1 - F(x))F(x)^{n-2}x \, dx - \int f(x)F(x)^{n-1}x \, dx - (n-1)(n-2) \int f(x)(1 - F(x))^2 F(x)^{n-3}x \, dx
\]
In the case where values are distributed $U[0, 1]$ this reduces to:

$$3(n - 1) \int_0^1 (1 - x)x^{n-1} \, dx - \int_0^1 x^n \, dx = \frac{1}{n(n + 1)} \quad (12)$$

Since expected revenue without the CPC-bidder equals $\frac{n - 2}{n}$ in the uniform case, the expected percentage revenue gain equals:

$$\frac{1}{n(n + 1)} \left(\frac{n - 2}{n}\right) = \frac{1}{(n - 2)(n + 1)} \quad (13)$$

There is a significant revenue gain if bidder values are uniformly distributed. We can see through numerical calculations of expected revenue that this is also the case for normally distributed values, with a variety of different standard valuations tested (see Figure 1). But we can go significantly further and analytically demonstrate that expected revenue will be increased for any distribution that has a monotonically increasing hazard rate.

**Definition 2** (Hazard rate). The hazard rate at value $x$ for distribution function $F$ with density $f$ is:

$$\frac{f(x)}{1 - F(x)} \quad (15)$$

**Theorem 2.** When all agent values are i.i.d. according to a distribution with monotonically increasing hazard rate, the SP mechanism yields greater expected revenue than the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism.

**Proof.** We need to show that for arbitrary distribution $F$ satisfying the hazard rate condition, $3\mathcal{E}_2 - \mathcal{E}_1 - 2\mathcal{E}_3 \geq 0$. Equivalently, $2(\mathcal{E}_2 - \mathcal{E}_3) - (\mathcal{E}_1 - \mathcal{E}_2) \geq 0$. We can express $\mathcal{E}_1$ as:

$$\mathcal{E}_1 = n \int F(x)^{n-1} f(x) x \, dx \quad (16)$$

We can express $\mathcal{E}_2$ as:

$$\mathcal{E}_2 = n(n - 1) \int (1 - F(x))F(x)^{n-2} f(x) x \, dx \quad (17)$$

$$= n \left[ F(x)^{n-1} (1 - F(x)) \right]_0^\infty - \int F(x)^{n-1} \left(-xf(x) + (1 - F(x)) \right) \, dx \quad (18)$$

$$= n \int F(x)^{n-1} f(x) x \, dx - n \int F(x)^{n-1}(1 - F(x)) \, dx \quad (19)$$

$$= \mathcal{E}_1 - n \int F(x)^{n-1}(1 - F(x)) \, dx \quad (20)$$
In a similar manner,

\[
\mathcal{E}_3 = \frac{n(n-1)(n-2)}{2} \int (1 - F(x))^2 F(x)^{n-3} f(x) \, dx
\]

\[
= \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \left[ F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x))^2 \right]_0^\infty - \int F(x)^{n-2} \left( (1 - F(x))^2 - 2x(1 - F(x))f(x) \right) \, dx
\]

\[
= n(n-1) \int x F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x)) f(x) \, dx - \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \int F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x))^2 \, dx
\]

\[
= \mathcal{E}_2 - \frac{n(n-1)}{2} \int F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x))^2 \, dx
\]

So \(2(\mathcal{E}_2 - \mathcal{E}_3) = n(n-1) \int F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x))^2 \, dx\) and \((\mathcal{E}_1 - \mathcal{E}_2) = n \int F(x)^{n-1} (1 - F(x)) \, dx\). Then the expected revenue gain, \(2(\mathcal{E}_2 - \mathcal{E}_3) - (\mathcal{E}_1 - \mathcal{E}_2)\), is

\[
n(n-1) \int F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x))^2 \, dx - n \int F(x)^{n-1} (1 - F(x)) \, dx
\]

\[
= n \int F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x)) \left( (n-1)(1 - F(x)) - F(x) \right) \, dx
\]

\[
= n \int F(x)^{n-2} (1 - F(x)) \left( n - 1 - nF(x) \right) \, dx
\]

\[
= \frac{n}{n-1} \int (n-1) F(x)^{n-2} f(x) \left[ \frac{1 - F(x)}{f(x)} \cdot (n - 1 - nF(x)) \right] \, dx
\]

Note that \((n-1) F(x)^{n-2} f(x)\) is a density, as

\[
\int (n-1) F(x)^{n-2} f(x) \, dx = F(x)^{n-1}|_0^\infty = 1
\]

Let \(p_x = (n-1) F(x)^{n-2} f(x)\). Then Eq. (28) can be rewritten:

\[
\frac{n}{n-1} \mathbb{E}_p \left[ \frac{1 - F(x)}{f(x)} \cdot (n - 1 - nF(x)) \right]
\]

(30)

\[
\geq \frac{n}{n-1} \mathbb{E}_p \left[ \frac{1 - F(x)}{f(x)} \right] \mathbb{E}_p \left[ n - 1 - nF(x) \right],
\]

(31)

where the inequality follows because, using the assumption of increasing hazard rate, \(\frac{1 - F(x)}{f(x)}\) and \(n - 1 - nF(x)\) are positively correlated (both decreasing in \(x\)).

We know that \(\mathbb{E}_p \left[ \frac{1 - F(x)}{f(x)} \right] \geq 0\) since both numerator and denominator are non-negative. To evaluate the second term of Eq. (31),

\[
\frac{1}{n-1} \mathbb{E}_p \left[ n - 1 - nF(x) \right] = \int F(x)^{n-2} f(x) \left( (n-1) - nF(x) \right) \, dx
\]

(32)

\[
= F(x)^{n-1} |_0^\infty - F(x)^n |_0^\infty = 0
\]

(33)

Therefore, the change in revenue from incorporating the arbitrageur/CPC-bidder through the SP mechanism is at least 0. 

\[\square\]
There’s also a significant efficiency gain over a mechanism that excludes the CPC-bidder/arbitrager. Taking $E[v]$ as our efficiency metric, letting $E_n$ represent this quantity for $n$ bidders in the symmetric case, the percentage efficiency gains equal $\frac{E_n - E_{n-1}}{E_{n-1}}$. For uniform values this equals $\frac{1}{n^2 - 1}$. (See Figure 1.)

![Figure 1: Expected revenue and efficiency gains of allowing a single CPC-bidder and arbitrager to participate under the SP mechanism, for uniform (left) and normal (right) value distributions. Specifically, let $X$ denote the average efficiency (or revenue) of the CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism, and $Y$ be that for the SP mechanism; we plot $(Y - X)/X$.](image)

### 2.2 Value for an unclicked impression

As the proof of Theorem 1 exposes, efficiency of the SP mechanism is critically dependent on the assumption that the CPC-bidder obtains non-zero value only upon click. In this subsection we show that if this is not the case, and the bidder has some value for an unclicked impression, we can achieve efficiency with a variant of the SP mechanism in an ex post equilibrium.

Imagine that the CPC-bidder has value $v^\ast$ per click and additional value $k^\ast$ for the impression independent of whether there’s a click. Then his expected utility under the SP mechanism, conditional on being allocated the impression, equals:

$$p^\ast \left( v^\ast - \frac{b^{(1)}}{\hat{p}} \right) + k^\ast$$

This will be positive (and thus the CPC-bidder would want to win) even if $v^\ast < b^{(1)}/\hat{p} + \delta$ for some $\delta > 0$, and so incentive compatibility no longer holds. The maximum $\delta$ for which this will be true is dependent on $p^\ast$; there is no longer a dominant strategy because the CPC-bidder should bid in a way that balances his unconditional allocation value ($k^\ast$) with his conditional value ($v^\ast$), and the odds of this conditional value being reaped depends on $p^\ast$.

Nonetheless the mechanism can be adapted and we can achieve truthfulness with a weaker equilibrium notion as follows. The adapted mechanism elicits two reports from
the CPC-bidder: his unconditional impression value and his click value. Note that
the CPC-bidder, though he now obtains positive value for an unclicked impression,
remains unwilling to pay-per-impression.

**Definition 3. (SP mechanism for CPC-bidders with impression value (SP-iv))** The CPC-bidder announces a value-per-click \( \hat{v} \) and a value-per-impression \( \hat{k} \), the arbitrager announces a probability-of-click \( \hat{p} \), and each CPM bidder \( i \in I \) announces a value-per-impression \( b_i \), with \( b \) denoting the vector of CPM bids.

- If \( \hat{p} \hat{v} + \hat{k} < b^{(1)} \), the impression is allocated to bidder \( \arg \max_{i \in I} b_i \) who pays \( \max\{\hat{p} \hat{v} + \hat{k}, b^{(2)}\} \) (ties can be broken arbitrarily).
- If \( \hat{p} \hat{v} + \hat{k} \geq b^{(1)} \), the impression is allocated to the CPC-bidder and the arbitrager pays \( b^{(1)} - \hat{k} \). If the impression is clicked, additionally the arbitrager is paid \( \hat{v} \) and the CPC-bidder pays \( \frac{b^{(1)}}{\hat{p}} \).

The SP-iv mechanism modifies the SP mechanism by considering impression value
to the CPC-bidder in determining the (efficient) allocation, and by decreasing the
arbitrager’s charge (when the CPC-bidder is allocated the impression) by the CPC-
bidder’s reported impression value.

**Theorem 3.** The SP-iv mechanism is truthful and efficient in ex post Nash equi-
librium for the generalized setting where CPC-bidders may derive non-zero value for an
unclicked impression.

**Proof.** Noting that the CPC-bidder’s expected value for the impression equals \( p^* v^* + k^* \),
the mechanism chooses an allocation that is efficient with respect to agent reports, so
the theorem follows if truth-telling is an ex post Nash equilibrium.

For each CPM-bidder, truthfulness is a dominant strategy because each is facing a
second-price auction. Now, for arbitrary CPM bids and arbitrary true click probability
\( p^* \), assume that the arbitrager truthfully bids \( \hat{p} = p^* \). If the CPC-bidder is allocated
the impression his expected utility will be \( p^* v^* - b^{(1)} + k^* \). Conditional on winning
the impression, this is independent of his announced values \( \hat{v} \) and \( \hat{k} \). His utility is thus
maximized if he is allocated the impression if and only if \( p^* v^* + k^* \geq b^{(1)} \). Reporting
\( \hat{v} = v^* \) and \( \hat{k} = k^* \) achieves this, and thus truthfulness is a best-response.

Now, taking the arbitrager’s perspective, consider arbitrary CPM bids and truthful
reports \( \hat{v} = v^* \) and \( \hat{k} = k^* \) for the CPC-bidder, for arbitrary true click and impression
values \( v^* \) and \( k^* \). If allocated the impression the arbitrager obtains expected utility
\( p^* v^* - b^{(1)} + k^* \). This is identical to the CPC-bidder’s expected utility and, conditional
on winning the impression, is also independent of the arbitrager’s announced \( \hat{p} \). His
utility is thus maximized if he is allocated the impression if and only if \( p^* v^* + k^* \geq b^{(1)} \).
Reporting \( \hat{p} = p^* \) achieves this, and thus truthfulness is a best-response.

This mechanism does not recover dominant strategy truthfulness. To see this con-
sider the case where the arbitrager over-reports the probability of click \( \hat{p} > p^* \) and:

\[
b^{(1)} > \hat{p} v^* + k^* \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{p} > \frac{p^* b^{(1)}}{p^* v^* + k^*}
\]
These inequalities are quite compatible, and note that, if truthful, the CPC-bidder will not receive the impression. Now if the CPC-bidder were to over-report (either \(v^*\), \(p^*\), or both) to be allocated the impression his expected utility would equal \(p^*v^* - \frac{2}{p} b^{(1)} + k^*\), and this is strictly positive. Therefore in this case truthfulness is not optimal and so the mechanism is not strategyproof.

In the truthful ex post Nash equilibrium of the SP-iv mechanism, the expected revenue, conditional on allocation to the CPC-bidder, equals:

\[
b^{(1)} - k^* - p^* \left( v^* - \frac{b^{(1)}}{p^*} \right)
\]

(35)

\[
= 2b^{(1)} - p^*v^* - k^*
\]

(36)

Conditional on allocation to a CPM-bidder, it is \(\max\{p^*v^* + k^*, b^{(2)}\}\).

If we assume that the CPC-bidder’s total expected value for the impression (i.e., \(p^*v^* + k^*)\) is drawn from the same distribution as the CPM bidders’ values, then the revenue and efficiency analysis of Section 2.1 applies with equal validity in this enriched setting, though we must settle for analyzing results in an ex post Nash rather than dominant strategy equilibrium.

For the rest of the paper we return to the model wherein CPC-bidders are assumed to possibly obtain non-zero value only upon click.

### 3 Inefficient alternatives

The SP mechanism is a compelling solution: it is efficient in dominant strategies and, for a broad range of natural value distributions, will increase revenue over a solution that excludes CPC-bidders. However, for some distributions it will not meet this revenue criterion, and even when it does, on given problem instances the revenue may be lower than would result under the CPC-bidder-excluding solution. Another concern is collusion: since the center pays the arbitrager the CPC-bidder’s reported value if a click occurs, if the CPC-bidder has the highest true value then reporting a dramatically higher value does not diminish his utility at all, yet it may greatly increase that of the arbitrager. The two parties can potentially collude to extract an unbounded sum from the mechanism.

In this section we consider alternative mechanisms that mitigate these issues at the cost of efficiency. They will achieve revenue and efficiency dominance with respect to the CPC-bidder-excluding auction, i.e., they will never yield less equilibrium revenue or efficiency on any instance, and they will also eliminate the collusion problem described above. We propose the ASP and BSP mechanisms, which differ from the SP mechanism only in how the click-contingent payments for the CPC-bidder and arbitrager are defined, should they submit the highest joint bid.

**Definition 4.** (Arbitrager second-price (ASP) and Bidder second-price (BSP) mechanisms) The CPC-bidder announces a value-per-click \(\hat{v}\), the arbitrager announces a probability-of-click \(\hat{p}\), and each CPM-bidder \(i \in I\) announces a value-per-impression \(b_i\), with \(b\) denoting the vector of CPM bids.
• If \( \hat{p} \hat{v} < b^{(1)} \), the impression is allocated to bidder \( \arg \max_{i \in I} b_i \) who pays \( \max\{\hat{p} \hat{v}, b^{(2)}\} \) (ties can be broken arbitrarily).

• If \( \hat{p} \hat{v} \geq b^{(1)} \), the impression is allocated to the CPC-bidder and the arbitrager pays \( b^{(1)} \). If the impression is clicked then additional payments are made, defined in the ASP and BSP mechanisms, respectively, as:

  - (ASP) The arbitrager is paid \( \hat{v} \) and the CPC-bidder pays \( \hat{p} \).
  - (BSP) The arbitrager is paid \( \frac{b^{(1)}}{p} \) and the CPC-bidder pays \( \frac{b^{(1)}}{p} \).

The ASP mechanism can be thought of as second-price for the arbitrager but first-price for the CPC-bidder; the BSP mechanism can be thought of as second-price for the CPC-bidder but first-price (in a sense) for the arbitrager. In the case of the ASP mechanism the CPC-bidder will have an incentive to under-report his value, while the arbitrager’s best strategy is truth; under the BSP mechanism the arbitrager will have incentive to under-report his predicted probability-of-click, though the CPC-bidder is best off being truthful.

Since in these mechanisms over-reporting is a dominated strategy, there is no risk of the CPC-bidder/arbitrager winning when they do not have the highest value. Thus they will only improve efficiency over a mechanism that excludes them; and revenue also will only increase since they can only increase the second-highest bid. The following two propositions follow for the same reasons given in the proof of Theorem 1.

**Proposition 1.** Truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for the arbitrager in the ASP mechanism.

**Proposition 2.** Truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for the CPC-bidder in the BSP mechanism.

**Theorem 4.** Assuming CPM-bidders play only undominated strategies, then on every possible value profile the ASP and BSP mechanisms both yield weakly greater revenue than the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism.

**Proof.** Under ASP, BSP, and the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism, truthfulness is a dominant strategy for CPM-bidders. So assume all CPM-bidders bid truthfully. The revenue in ASP or BSP will be different from that in the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism if and only if the CPC-bidder/arbitrager’s joint bid \( (\hat{p} \hat{v}) \) is greater than the second highest CPM-bidder value \( b^{(2)} \). And in this case the total revenue to the mechanism will equal either \( b^{(1)} \) or \( \hat{p} \hat{v} \) (which is \( > b^{(2)} \)), whereas in the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism revenue equals \( b^{(2)} \). Thus regardless of the strategies chosen by the CPC-bidder and arbitrager, revenue can only be increased.

**Theorem 5.** Assuming all agents play only undominated strategies, then on every possible value profile the ASP and BSP mechanisms both yield weakly greater allocation value (efficiency) than the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism.
Proof. Under ASP, BSP, and the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism, truthfulness is a dominant strategy for CPM-bidders. Under the ASP and BSP mechanisms, over-bidding by the CPC-bidder or arbitrager is dominated by truth telling: if a particular report leads to allocation when truth telling would not, then negative expected utility will result, and conditional on being allocated the impression, bidding higher than truth can only increase the payment that must be made to the center. So if only undominated strategies are played, the allocation under ASP or BSP will differ from that under the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism only if the CPC-bidder/arbitrager are allocated the impression with a joint bid that is weakly greater than the highest CPM-bid; but this joint bid will be no greater than the true joint value and thus the impression will have been allocated efficiently and allocation value will have been (weakly) improved.

To understand the equilibrium behavior of the potentially (rationally) non-truthful parties in the ASP and BSP mechanisms, we consider the expected value they would achieve as a function of their reports. First consider the ASP mechanism. Let \( f_p \) and \( F_p \) denote, respectively, the p.d.f. and c.d.f. representing the CPC-bidder’s beliefs about the click-probability which the arbitrager will (truthfully, by Proposition 1) report. Recall that \( F \) (with no subscript) denotes the c.d.f. for any one of the \( n-1 \) CPM bidders’ bids. The CPC-bidder’s expected utility from reporting \( \hat{v} \) when his true value is \( v^* \) equals:

\[
\int f_p(p)F(p\hat{v})^{n-1}p(v^* - \hat{v}) \, dp \quad (37)
\]

From here in the special case of uniformly distributed values we can compute the CPC-bidder’s equilibrium bid, without assuming anything about his beliefs regarding \( p^* \).

Proposition 3. If all values are i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution and other agents play only undominated strategies, the CPC-bidder’s expected utility-maximizing bid in the ASP mechanism equals \( \frac{n-1}{n} v^* \), regardless of his beliefs about \( p^* \).

Proof. All agents besides the CPC-bidder have truthfulness as a dominant strategy, so assume they are truthful. Considering Eq. (37), and noting that \( F(x)^{n-1} = x^{n-1} \) in the case of the \( U[0,1] \) distribution, the CPC-bidder’s expected utility for bidding \( \hat{v} \) when his true value is \( v^* \) equals:

\[
\int_0^1 f_p(p)p^{n-1}\hat{v}^{n-1}p(v^* - \hat{v}) \, dp 
\]

\[
= \hat{v}^{n-1}(v^* - \hat{v}) \int_0^1 f_p(p)p^n \, dp 
\]

(38)

Then taking the partial derivative with respect to the CPC-bidder’s bid, we get:

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{v}}(\text{Eq. (39)}) = ((n-1)v^*\hat{v}^{n-2} - n\hat{v}^{n-1}) \int_0^1 f_p(p)p^n \, dp 
\]

\[
= \hat{v}^{n-2}((n-1)v^* - n\hat{v}) \int_0^1 f_p(p)p^n \, dp 
\]

(40)

(41)
This has roots at \( \hat{v} = 0 \) and \( \hat{v} = \frac{n-1}{n} v^* \), the latter of which is the maximum. Thus, given truthfulness of the CPM-bidders and the arbitrager (which is a dominant strategy for them), if values are distributed uniformly, the CPC-bidder’s expected utility is maximized by bidding \( \frac{n-1}{n} \) times his true value, regardless of \( f_p \).

Now considering the BSP mechanism, let \( f_v \) and \( F_v \) denote, respectively, the p.d.f. and c.d.f. representing the arbitrager’s beliefs about the value that the CPC-bidder will (truthfully, by Proposition 2) report. Let \( g \) and \( G \), respectively, denote the p.d.f. and c.d.f. for the highest CPM value. The arbitrager’s expected utility from reporting \( \hat{p} \) when the true probability is \( p^* \) equals:

\[
\int_0^1 f_v(v) \int_0^{p_v} g(c) \left( \frac{p^*_v c - c}{p} \right) dc \, dv 
\]  

(42)

Proposition 4. If all values are i.i.d. according to the uniform distribution and other agents play only undominated strategies, the arbitrager’s expected utility-maximizing report in the BSP mechanism equals \( \frac{n-1}{n} p^* \), regardless of his beliefs about \( v^* \).

Proof. All agents besides the CPC-bidder have truthfulness as a dominant strategy, so assume they are truthful. Considering Eq. (42), the arbitrager’s expected utility for reporting \( \hat{p} \) when the true probability is \( p^* \) equals:

\[
\left( \frac{p^*_v}{\hat{p}} - 1 \right) \int_0^1 f_v(v) \int_0^{p_v} g(c) c \, dc \, dv 
\]  

(43)

\[
= \left( \frac{p^*_v}{\hat{p}} - 1 \right) \int_0^1 f_v(v) \left[ \hat{p} v G(\hat{p} v) - \int_0^{\hat{p} v} G(c) \, dc \right] \, dv 
\]  

(44)

Noting that \( G(x) = x^{n-1} \) in the case of the \( U[0, 1] \) distribution, this equals:

\[
\left( \frac{p^*_v}{\hat{p}} - 1 \right) \int_0^1 f_v(v) \left[ \hat{p}^n v^n - \int_0^{\hat{p} v} c^{n-1} \, dc \right] \, dv 
\]  

(45)

\[
= \left( \frac{p^*_v}{\hat{p}} - 1 \right) \int_0^1 f_v(v) \left[ \hat{p}^n v^n - \frac{1}{n} \hat{p}^n v^n \right] \, dv 
\]  

(46)

\[
= (\hat{p}^{n-1} p^* - \hat{p}^n) \int_0^1 f_v(v) v^n \frac{n-1}{n} \, dv 
\]  

(47)

Then taking the partial derivative with respect to the arbitrager’s report, we get:

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \hat{p}} (\text{Eq. (47)}) = \left( (n-1) p^* \hat{p}^{n-2} - n \hat{p}^{n-1} \right) \int_0^1 f_v(v) v^n \frac{n-1}{n} \, dv 
\]  

(48)

This has roots at \( \hat{p} = 0 \) and \( \hat{p} = \frac{n-1}{n} p^* \), the latter of which is the maximum. Thus, given truthfulness of the CPM-bidders and the uniform distribution over values, the arbitrager’s expected utility is maximized by reporting \( \frac{n-1}{n} \) times the true probability-of-click, regardless of \( f_v \).
This analysis demonstrates that, in the case of uniformly distributed values, the outcomes of the ASP and BSP mechanisms are identical in equilibrium: in each case the equilibrium “joint bid” by the CPC-bidder/arbitrager pair will be \( \frac{n-1}{n} p^* v^* \). However this equivalence will not hold for other distributions and, unfortunately, in general the equilibrium bids will depend on the CPC-bidder’s (arbitrager’s) belief about the arbitrager’s (CPC-bidder’s) report. But we can fall back on Theorems 4 and 5 to conclude that, whatever the distributions over \( v^* \) and \( p^* \), efficiency and revenue will only be increased over the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism.

The equilibrium expected value to the highest bidder—which is a measure of efficiency—in the ASP or BSP mechanisms with uniformly distributed values equals:

\[
\int_0^1 \left[ \left( \frac{n-1}{n} x \right)^{n-1} x + \int_\frac{n-1}{n}^1 (n-1)y^{n-1} dy \right] dx
\]

(49)

\[
= \frac{n-1}{n} + \frac{1}{n+1} \left[ \left( \frac{n-1}{n} \right)^{n-1} - \left( \frac{n-1}{n} \right)^{n+1} \right]
\]

(50)

Figure 2 depicts the expected percentage efficiency and revenue gains of moving to either the ASP or BSP mechanism from the arbitrager-excluding approach, in the same manner as did Figure 1 for the SP mechanism, for the uniform values case. The revenue increase is slightly more than that of the SP mechanism, although the efficiency gain is less, which could have been deduced from the fact that the SP mechanism is perfectly efficient for all distributions and the ASP and BSP mechanisms are not, regardless of the distribution.

Figure 2: Expected revenue and efficiency gains of allowing a single CPC-bidder and arbitrager to participate under the ASP and BSP mechanisms, for uniformly distributed values. The dashed line represents the efficiency improvement achieved by the SP mechanism, which always allocates the impression efficiently.
4 Generalizations

The two most important ways in which the setting we’ve considered thus far can be generalized are: allowing for multiple CPC-bidders, and allowing for multiple arbitragers. To handle incentives with these generalizations we will have to use somewhat more complex mechanisms, but the basic analysis at play with respect to the SP mechanism and the single CPC-bidder/arbitrager setting continues to hold. We now let $C$ denote the set of (CPC) bidders only willing to pay-per-click, and let $R$ denote the set of arbitragers.

4.1 Multiple CPC-bidders, each with one arbitrager

We first consider the case where CPC-bidders and arbitragers come in pairs, so there is no competition amongst arbitragers for any given CPC-bidder, but there is competition between CPC-bidder/arbitrager pairs. We call this the captive arbitrager setting.

Definition 5. (SP mechanism for captive arbitrager settings (SP-ca)) Each CPC-bidder $c \in C$ announces a value-per-click $\hat{v}_c$, each arbitrager $r_c \in R$ announces a probability-of-click $\hat{p}_c$ for his associated CPC-bidder $c$, and each CPM-bidder $i \in I$ announces a value-per-impression $b_i$. Let $b_c$ denote $\hat{p}_c \hat{v}_c$ for each $c \in C$, let $b$ denote the set of bids $\{b_j\}_{j \in I \cup C}$, and let $h \in \arg\max_{j \in I \cup C} b_j$, breaking ties arbitrarily.

- If $h \in I$: the impression is allocated to bidder $h$ who pays $b^{(2)}$.
- Alternatively if $h \in C$: the impression is allocated to bidder $h$ and arbitrager $r_h$ pays $b^{(2)}$. If the impression is clicked, additionally $h$ pays $b^{(2)} \hat{p}_h$ and $r_h$ is paid $\hat{v}_h$.

Theorem 6. The SP-ca mechanism is truthful and efficient in dominant strategies for the captive arbitrager setting, for any number of CPC-bidder/arbitrager pairs.

Proof. The mechanism chooses the efficient outcome according to agent reports, and strategyproofness holds by the same argument used in Theorem 1: conditional on winning, the winning bidder (or arbitrager) pays an amount independent of his bid (or probability-of-click prediction); and his expected utility for winning is positive if and only if a truthful bid would win.

4.2 Multiple CPC-bidders, one arbitrager for all

We now consider the case where there is a single arbitrager that can potentially pair up with more than one CPC-bidder; we call this the sole arbitrager setting. Whereas in the previous setting we could base the arbitrager’s payment on bids by CPC-bidders (since his reports had no interaction with any CPC bids except one), here instead we must charge the arbitrager based only on CPM bids, though CPC-bidders can still be charged based on other CPC bids.

Definition 6. (SP mechanism for sole arbitrager settings (SP-sa)) Each CPC-bidder $c \in C$ announces a value-per-click $\hat{v}_c$, the arbitrager announces a probability-of-click $\hat{p}_c$ for each CPC-bidder $c$, and each CPM-bidder $i \in I$ announces a
value-per-impression $b_i$. Let $b_c$ denote $\hat{p}_c \hat{v}_c$ for each $c \in C$, let $b$ denote the set of bids \{${b_j}$\}$_{j \in I \cup C}$, and let $h \in \arg \max_{j \in I \cup C} b_j$, breaking ties arbitrarily.

- If $h \in I$: the impression is allocated to bidder $h$ who pays $b^{(2)}$.
- Alternatively if $h \in C$: the impression is allocated to bidder $h$ and the arbitrager pays $\max_{i \in I} b_i$. If the impression is clicked, additionally $h$ pays $\frac{b^{(2)}}{\hat{p}_h}$ and the arbitrager is paid $\hat{v}_h$.

The key difference from the SP-ca mechanism is that in the SP-sa mechanism the arbitrager pays the maximum CPM bid rather than the maximum bid overall.

**Theorem 7.** The SP-sa mechanism is truthful and efficient in dominant strategies for the sole arbitrager setting, for any number of CPC-bidders.

**Proof.** Again, strategyproofness for all bidders holds by the same argument used in Theorem 1: conditional on winning, the winning bidder pays an amount independent of his bid; and his expected utility is maximized by winning exactly when a truthful bid would win.

For the arbitrager an analogous argument applies. Conditional on a CPM-bidder winning the arbitrager’s utility is 0. Conditional on some CPC-bidder $h$ winning, the arbitrager’s expected utility equals:

$$p^*_h \hat{v}_h - \max_{i \in I} b_i$$

(51)

Conditional on the allocation, this quantity is independent of the arbitrager’s reports. It is maximized if $h \in \arg \max_{c \in C} p^*_c \hat{v}_c$, and this is achieved by truthfully reporting $\bar{p}_c = p^*_c, \forall c \in C$. Also, this quantity is negative if and only if $p^*_h \hat{v}_h < \max_{i \in I} b_i$, so the arbitrager would never want to win the auction through a non-truthful over-report or lose it through a non-truthful under-report.

### 4.3 Multiple CPC-bidders, each with multiple arbitragers

We finally consider the most general setting, in which there are multiple CPC-bidders and multiple arbitrages, with each arbitrager potentially predicting the probability-of-click for more than one (or even all) of the CPC-bidders. We call this the many arbitrager setting. For any arbitrager $r \in R$, $C_r$ will denote the set of CPC-bidders for whom $r$ submits a prediction bid. In this model where more than one arbitrager may submit a prediction regarding each CPC-bidder’s probability-of-click, we depart from the assumption that arbitrages know the “true” probability-of-click; instead there may be varying estimates, a result of different information held by the different arbitrages. But now allocative efficiency is no longer clearly defined; if which agent has the highest (expected) value for the impression is a matter of opinion, then we will not be able to pick one allocation as objectively superior to the others.

**Definition 7.** (SP mechanism for many arbitrager settings (SP-MA)) Each CPC-bidder $c \in C$ announces a value-per-click $\hat{v}_c$, each arbitrager $r \in R$ announces a probability-of-click $\hat{p}_{c,r}$ for each CPC-bidder $c \in C_r$ (where $C_r$ can be defined arbitrarily by $r$), and each CPM bidder $i \in I$ announces a value-per-impression $b_i$. 

• For each \( c \in C \), let \( R_c \) denote \( \{ r \in R : c \in C_r \} \). For each \( c \in C \), an \( r_c \in R_c \) is chosen according to a decision rule that is independent of each arbitrager’s reported probability-of-click for \( c \).

Let \( b_c \) denote \( \hat{p}_{r_c,c} \hat{v}_c \) for each \( c \in C \), let \( b \) denote the set of bids \( \{ b_j \}_{j \in I \cup C} \), and let \( h \in \arg \max_{j \in I \cup C} b_j \), breaking ties arbitrarily.

• If \( h \in I \); the impression is allocated to bidder \( h \) who pays \( b^{(2)} \).

• Alternatively if \( h \in C \); the impression is allocated to bidder \( h \) and arbitrager \( r_h \) pays \( \max_{i \in I \cup \{ c \in C : r_c \neq r_h \}} b_i \). If the impression is clicked, additionally \( h \) pays \( \hat{p}_{r_h} \) and \( r_h \) is paid \( \hat{v}_h \).

**Theorem 8.** The SP-ma mechanism is strategyproof in the many arbitrager setting.

**Proof.** Strategyproofness for all bidders holds by the same argument deployed in proving the previous theorems. For the arbitragers, a strategy has two components: which CPC-bidders to submit a prediction for, and what predictions to submit given that some prediction is submitted. First consider whether \( r \) could ever gain by submitting a prediction for CPC-bidders other than those for whom he has a predicted probability-of-click. Here we see that our model, which takes arbitragers as risk-neutral Bayesian optimizers, leads to \( r \) “having a prediction” for every CPC-bidder and thus submitting a \( \hat{p}_c \) for every \( c \in C \).

Now, for arbitrary arbitrager \( r \), given a set \( C_r \) of CPC-bidders for whom \( r \) will submit some prediction, submitting truthful predictions is a dominant strategy. This holds because, given that \( r \) wins the impression with CPC-bidder \( h \), his expected utility equals:

\[
p_h^*v_h - \max_{i \in I \cup \{ c \in C : r_c \neq r_h \}} b_i
\]

This is (conditionally) independent of the predictions he reports. Note that it is dependent on the set \( C_r \) of CPC-bidders for whom \( r \) makes a prediction—specifically, it can potentially be made higher by increasing the size of \( C_r \)—but as argued above \( C_r \) will equal the complete set anyway. Then Eq. (52) is maximized if, conditional on \( r \) winning with some CPC-bidder \( h \), \( h \in \arg \max_{c \in C} p_c^* \hat{v}_c \). Given the allocation rule this is achieved by the arbitrager truthfully reporting predictions. Moreover, by nature of the allocation rule, Eq. (52) will be non-negative exactly in the case that truthful bidding leads to \( r \) winning the auction (with some CPC-bidder), and so \( r \) could never gain by bidding untruthfully in order to win (lose) the auction in circumstances other than those under which he wins (loses) with truthful bidding.

The SP-ma mechanism specifies selecting an arbitrager for each CPC-bidder independent of his reported predictions, but this need not equate with selection at random. In practice each impression auction takes place in a broader context of the ongoing allocation of millions of impressions per day. One possibility in choosing arbitragers is to discriminate amongst them based on previous predictive accuracy (e.g., if \( r \) won with an estimated click probability of 0.7 one thousand times and, of those, seven
hundred led to clicks, \( r \) has been very accurate). This introduces a new consideration for strategic arbitragers, but it only presents a bias towards accurate prediction, which corresponds perfectly with truthful prediction given our model.

Along with such an approach one could allow an arbitrager, if selected to match with a particular CPC-bidder \( c \) in the first stage of the mechanism, to redefine his prediction to equal the mean probability-of-click predicted by the entire set of arbitragers for \( c \). This would allow for a “wisdom of the crowd” effect to potentially improve prediction accuracy, yet the mechanism guards against attracting know-nothing arbitragers by biasing selection towards historically accurate predictors.

Another approach is to not choose arbitragers independent of their bids, but instead to favor those who announce higher predictions. Creating a bias for over-estimation in this way would not lead to any decrease in revenue for the publisher, though it would break strategyproofness and may decrease efficiency somewhat. If the maximum prediction is selected, arbitragers now face a tradeoff of wanting to be highest (to be selected) and wanting to be accurate, which will lead the winner to be overoptimistic, reducing efficiency.

5 Empirical analysis

In this section we perform an empirical evaluation of the mechanisms introduced in the paper, specifically evaluating the monotone hazard rate assumption, and the non-decreasing revenue claims of Theorem 2. We find that while the hazard rate assumption does not hold for very low bids, the proposed mechanism is nevertheless revenue positive.

5.1 Data

The data for the experiments was collected as a random sample from six days of live traffic on the RightMedia Exchange (RMX) collected over two months. RMX is the largest ad exchange in the industry with over ten billion transactions daily (see http://rightmedia.com/about). The final dataset consists of approximately 1.5 million events, each corresponding to an auction for an ad placement. For each auction event we recorded all of the valid advertiser bids submitted to the publisher (i.e. those satisfying the supply and demand constraints), as well as the campaign type of the advertiser, i.e., whether they are a CPM or a CPC bidder.

5.2 Hazard rate

To investigate the hazard rate assumption, we computed the empirical distribution of all of the bids across all of the auctions. While the hazard rate is essentially constant for bids above above \$0.01 (per-impression bid), it is decreasing for the very low bids, as shown in Figure 3. We note that the presence of these low bids cannot be easily discounted, since they represent a sizable portion of all of the submitted bids. At the same time, in practice publishers often set up reserve prices that exclude exactly the bids that violate the hazard rate assumption.
5.3 Revenue and efficiency impact

The monotone hazard rate assumption forms a sufficient but not necessary condition for guaranteeing non-decreasing revenue in the presence of the arbitrager. To check whether the SP mechanism yields greater expected revenue than the second-price CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism, we used the collected auction data to compute the revenues under different mechanisms.

To compute the overall revenue we simulated both the SP and the CPC-bidder-excluding mechanisms. We note that a genuine evaluation of the CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism is difficult, since faced with this mechanism some of the CPC-bidders may switch to being CPM-bidders and take on the CPC-CPM conversion risk, rather than be locked out of the auction completely. Motivated by this ambiguity, we simulated the two mechanisms in two scenarios, each representing an opposite end of the spectrum with respect to whether a CPC-bidder would be willing to bid CPM in the CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism:

1. *All.* In this scenario we assume that all of the CPC-bidders remain CPC, and thus do not appear in the CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism.

2. *Random.* In this scenario we assume that a single randomly chosen CPC-bidder remains CPC, while all others become CPM-bidders.

We present both the revenue and efficiency gains in Table 1, as a percentage increase of moving to the SP mechanism from the CPC-bidder-excluding mechanism.

Under the *All* scenario, the SP mechanism provided more revenue to the publisher on each day. In the stricter *Random* scenario the results were mixed, with the overall gain fluctuating between ±1%.
Table 1: Empirical revenue and efficiency changes (in %) after moving to mechanism SP, for 6 days over the course of two months. The last column is the average over all auctions for the 6 days, and since some days had more auction samples than others, this is not identical to the sample average of the numbers in each row.

<table>
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<th>Metric</th>
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<th>Day 1</th>
<th>Day 2</th>
<th>Day 3</th>
<th>Day 4</th>
<th>Day 5</th>
<th>Day 6</th>
<th>Avg. over all days</th>
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<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
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</table>

6 Conclusion

Given a perfect estimator of whether any given ad will be clicked, including as many bidders as possible in an ad auction is ideal from an efficiency standpoint. Advertisers often prefer to bid on a CPC basis, while publishers can and do refuse CPC bids in favor of CPM bids. The mismatch between preferred payments can be resolved satisfactorily with intermediaries serving an arbitrage role. We provided an efficient mechanism in which truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for all parties, including arbitragers. There is also reason to be optimistic about the revenue impact to publishers, since for any value distribution with a monotonically increasing hazard rate, expected revenue will increase. We also provided two mechanisms which never reduce publisher revenue, while still increasing efficiency.

The empirical picture is less definitive. We found a mixed revenue-impact with respect to real bid data from Yahoo!’s Right Media Exchange. This could be because of the nature of the bid distribution (which does not satisfy the hazard condition), but there are other factors to consider. In practice no arbitrageur is a perfect predictor, and the prediction engine at work in the RMX data—which estimates click-probabilities for CPC-bidders—is imperfect. There is reason to believe this issue may be especially relevant in our data, because at the time the data was collected the prediction engine in use was relatively new and experimental.

Important directions for future work include, first, verifying that despite inevitably imperfect click-prediction, efficiency is increased by including CPC-bidders and arbitragers; and second, achieving a better understanding of the factors that determine whether moving to the efficient mechanism will increase publisher revenue. Future work should also more thoroughly address how to structure allocation decisions in a context of multiple CPC-bidders and competing arbitragers with imperfect predictions.

References


November 2008.


